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Unlocking Access to Health 
Care: A Federalist Approach to 
Reforming Occupational 
Licensing 
Gabriel Scheffler1 
Abstract 
Several features of the existing occupational licensing system 
impede access to health care without providing appreciable protections 
for patients. Licensing restrictions prevent health care providers from 
offering services to the full extent of their competency, obstruct the 
adoption of telehealth, and deter foreign-trained providers from 
practicing in the United States. Scholars and policymakers have 
proposed a number of reforms to this system over the years, but these 
proposals have had a limited impact for political and institutional 
reasons. 
Still, there are grounds for optimism. In recent years, the federal 
government has taken a range of initial steps to reform licensing 
requirements for health care providers, and these steps have the 
potential to improve access to health care. Together, they illustrate a 
federalist approach to licensing reform, in which the federal government 
encourages the states to reform their licensing regimes, while largely 
preserving states’ control over the system. These steps include: (1) 
easing federal licensing restrictions for health care providers in certain 
areas where the federal government possesses regulatory authority; (2) 
creating incentives for states and professional bodies to experiment with 
reforms; (3) intensifying the Federal Trade Commission’s focus on 
licensing boards’ anti-competitive conduct; and (4) generating 
additional pressure for state-level reforms through expanding health 
insurance and promoting delivery system reforms under the Affordable 
Care Act. 
This article argues that a federalist approach represents the most 
promising path toward reforming occupational licensing in health care. 
Federal intervention in licensing is necessary, due to states’ lack of 
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helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Many thanks also to Laurent Abergel, 
Evan Silverstein, and Timothy Von Dulm for excellent research support. 
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incentives to experiment with licensing reforms, the externalities of 
their licensing regimes, and their inability to resolve their own collective 
action problems. Nevertheless, large-scale federal preemption of state 
licensing laws is unlikely, due to a combination of interest group 
politics, Congress’s tendency toward incrementalism, and its reliance 
on the states to administer federal policies. A federalist approach also 
has functional advantages over outright federal preemption: it allows 
for more experimentation in constructing new licensing regimes, and it 
enables the federal government to take advantage of states’ 
institutional expertise in regulating occupations. Finally, this approach 
presents a model for how the federal government can play a constructive 
role in occupational licensing in other fields besides health care, and in 
other areas of state regulatory policy. 
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Introduction 
Occupational licensing has been enjoying something of a 
renaissance of late. After a number of years in which scholars and 
policymakers paid scant attention to licensing,2 there has been a 
noticeable surge in government initiatives and scholarly work focused 
on licensing in recent years.3 To name a few recent developments: the 
Senate held a hearing on occupational licensing and antitrust doctrine 
in 2016;4 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) formed an “Economic 
Liberty Taskforce” in 2017, which has focused in large part on 
licensing;5 the Supreme Court in 2015 held that state licensing boards 
are not automatically immune from federal antitrust scrutiny,6 leading 
several states to restructure their licensing systems;7 both the Trump 
Administration and the Obama Administration have publicly discussed 
the harms of licensing;8 and prominent media outlets, such as the New 
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and National Public Radio have 
featured stories on licensing.9 
 
2. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 189-
90 (2000) (“[E]ven though occupational licensing has historically been 
among the most examined institutions in labor economics, this institution 
has received relatively little recent attention, either from academics or the 
public policy press.”). 
3. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational 
Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2017) (“[A] 
movement against wasteful occupational licensing rules and regulations is 
gaining steam.”); Ryan Nunn, The Future of Occupational Licensing 
Reform, BROOKINGS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
opinions/the-future-of-occupational-licensing-reform/ (describing how “an 
increasingly broad array of stakeholders and policymakers have indicated 
a desire to reform occupational licensing”). 
4. License to Compete: Occupational Licensing and the State Action 
Doctrine Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & 
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016), 
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/license-to-
compete-occupational-licensing-and-the-state-action-doctrine. 
5. FTC Launches New Website Dedicated to Economic Liberty, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/03/ftc-launches-new-website-dedicated-economic-liberty. 
6. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015). 
7. See infra Part III C. 
8. DEP’T TREASURY OFF. ECON. POL’Y, THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, 
AND THE DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS (2015) [hereinafter WH REPORT]; THE COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISERS, THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF DEREGULATION (2017). 
9. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Moving to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a 
License, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/06/18/business/economy/job-licenses.html; Jacob Goldstein, Why 
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This resurgence of interest in licensing is warranted. Recent data 
suggest that roughly one-quarter of the workforce in the United States 
is licensed.10 Workers in licensed professions must obtain permission 
from the government—generally the state government, though some 
professions are licensed by the federal government or local 
governments11—to be granted the legal authority to work in their 
chosen field.12 To obtain a license, applicants typically must prove that 
they meet certain education and training standards, pass an 
examination, pay a fee to the licensing board, and fulfill other 
administrative requirements.13 
A growing body of empirical research finds that the current 
licensure system imposes substantial economic burdens on workers and 
consumers.14 Most licensing restrictions are set not by disinterested 
 
It’s Illegal to Braid Hair Without a License, NPR (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/21/154826233/why-
its-illegal-to-braid-hair-without-a-license; see e.g., Josh Zumbrun, 
Occupational Licenses May Be Bad for the Economy, But Good for 
Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016, 1:13 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational- licenses-
may-be-bad-for-the-economy-but-good-for-workers-who-have- them/. 
10. See Jason Furman & Laura Giuliano, New Data Show that One-Quarter 
of U.S. Workers Hold an Occupational License, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL 
OF ECON. ADVISERS BLOG (June 17, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/blog/2016/06/17/new-data-show-roughly-one-quarter-us-
workers-hold-occupational-license; Data on Certifications and Licenses, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/cps/certifications-
and-licenses.htm#highlights (last modified Jan. 18, 2019). 
11. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence 
of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31(2) J. LAB. ECON. S173, 
S184 (2013) [hereinafter Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market] (reporting the 
results of a survey on the licensure status of around 2,500 individuals that 
“about two-thirds of the licensed individuals in our sample are licensed at 
the state level, followed by the federal and local levels”). 
12. The term occupational licensing generally “encompasses all forms of 
regulation that give the licensed practitioner the legal authority to engage 
in his occupation or profession.” BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL., 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRAC. & POL’Y 8, 9. (1972). This contrasts 
with certification, which is “a nongovernmental mechanism for granting 
recognition to certain individuals within an occupation or profession.” 
13. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PUBLIC 
PERSPECTIVE 25-31 (1980). 
14. According to one rough “back-of-the-envelope” calculation, licensing in 
the U.S. results in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual 
cost to consumers of $203 billion. Morris Kleiner et al., A Proposal to 
Encourage States to Rationalize Occupational Licensing Practices (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, 2011) (unpublished proposal to the Brookings 
Institution Hamilton Project) [hereinafter Kleiner, A Proposal]; MORRIS 
KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES 6 (2015), 
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regulators, but rather by members of licensed professions who have an 
economic incentive to erect regulatory barriers that limit competition 
and deliver “economic rents”—profits that exceed what would exist in 
a competitive market.15 Licensing results in higher wages for licensed 
workers, but reduces employment and wages for unlicensed workers, 
creates higher prices for consumers, and limits access to services.16 
Empirical research also strongly suggests that licensing reduces 
geographic mobility.17 Workers in licensed professions typically must be 
licensed in each state in which they practice, and states often impose 
varying requirements to obtain and maintain a license, making it more 
difficult for workers to relocate from one state to another. 18 These costs 
are disproportionately borne by certain groups, such as immigrants and 
individuals with criminal records.19 
 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf. 
15. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, Transcript of 
Speech at the Brookings Institution on Occupational Licensing and 
Economic Rents at 1 (Nov. 2, 2015), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/201
51102_occupational_licensing_and_economic_rents.pdf. But see 
Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: 
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, ANN. REV. 
L. SOC. SCI. 309, 322 (2018) (arguing that “[b]y restricting entry, 
occupational and professional regulations establish market shelters that 
enhance the bargaining power of workers, raising wages and improving 
worker welfare.”). 
16. See, e.g., WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (reviewing the empirical 
literature on the impacts of licensing on the labor market, and finding 
that licensing restrictions lead to prices that are 3 to 16 percent higher, 
that licensed workers earn 10 to 15 percent more than unlicensed workers 
studies with similar levels of education and training, and that licensing 
reduces interstate mobility). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 15 (finding that “there are substantial differences in the 
likelihood of moving across State lines between workers in highly licensed 
occupations versus other workers, while there are only modest differences 
between the two groups in the likelihood of moving within a State”); 
Morris S. Kleiner et al., Barriers to Labor Migration: The Case of 
Occupational Licensing, 21 INDUS. RELATIONS 383 (1982); Arlene Holen, 
Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor 
Mobility and Resource Allocation, 73 J. POL. ECON. 492, 492 (1965); Janna 
E. Johnson & Morris M. Kleiner, Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to 
Interstate Migration?, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 24107, 2017). 
18. See WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 8, 25, 27. 
19. See, e.g., Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Unlicensed & 
Untapped: Removing Barriers to State Occupational Licenses for People 
with Records, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 1 (2016), 
http://nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-Removing-
Barriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf (finding over 12,000 licensing 
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One important problem with the current licensure system that has 
received less attention is that it impedes access to health care. Although 
licensing requirements for health care providers are widely viewed as 
necessary to protect public safety, several features of the licensure 
system obstruct access to health care while doing little to ensure 
quality. For instance, licensing restrictions prevent health care 
providers such as nurse practitioners from offering services to the full 
extent of their competency, obstruct the adoption of telehealth by often 
requiring that health care providers be separately licensed in each state 
in which their patients are located, and deter foreign-trained providers 
from practicing in the United States by requiring them to complete 
costly often duplicative training and testing.20 
Despite criticism of this system, the United States licensing regime 
has proven to be remarkably resistant to change. One reason for this is 
interest group politics: many of the benefits of licensure accrue to the 
licensed professionals who make up these organizations, while its costs 
are dispersed broadly across the population.21 Yet the story is more 
complicated than that: licensing is also often viewed as a signal of the 
prestige and value of a profession, so many licensed professionals regard 
efforts to reform licensing as attacks on their profession’s worth.22 These 
dynamics have led some scholars to conclude that the political process 
is incapable of reforming licensing , and that litigation is the only viable 
option.23 
This article shows that while these barriers are formidable, they are 
not insuperable. In recent years, the federal government has taken a 
number of initial steps aimed at improving access to health care by 
reforming licensing restrictions for health care providers. For instance, 
the federal government has recently eased licensing restrictions for 
health care providers in certain areas where it already possesses 
regulatory authority, created incentives for states and professional 
 
restrictions that automatically disqualify individuals with any type of 
felony, and over 6,000 restrictions that disqualify people with a 
misdemeanor); WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 38, 41. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix 
Occupational Licensing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 848 (2017) 
(“[O]ccupational licensing is difficult to reform because it provides 
concentrated benefits to an organized few, while imposing costs diffusely 
on the public.”); David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of 
Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 119 (2017) (“The politics of 
occupational licensing follow a classic Olsonian script.”). See generally, 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43 (1965); George Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
22. SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 210. 
23. See, e.g. Blevins, supra note 21, at 870. 
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bodies to experiment with reforms, intensified its focus on licensing 
boards’ anti-competitive conduct, and created additional pressure for 
state-level reforms through expanding health insurance and promoting 
delivery system reforms under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).24 
Together, these steps represent a federalist approach to licensing 
reform, in which the federal government incentivizes states to change 
their licensing laws, while largely preserving states’ control over their 
licensing regimes. Although these measures are limited, they 
demonstrate that the federal government is capable of reforming 
licensing, and together they pave a path toward improving access to 
health care. They also illustrate the range of tools the federal 
government has at its disposal to reform the licensing system, short of 
simply preempting state law. 
Describing an approach in which the federal government intrudes 
onto a traditional area of state sovereignty as “federalist” may appear 
to be a misnomer.25 Yet the traditional notion of “dual federalism,” in 
which the federal government and states have completely separate 
spheres of authority and do not coordinate with one another,26 is no 
longer as relevant today when “Congress’s lawmaking reach . . . is now 
essentially unlimited with respect to the areas into which federal 
statutory power can go.”27 Rather, as argued by Professor Abbe Gluck, 
federalism today—”in the sense of state power, relevance, autonomy, 
and sovereignty—mostly comes and goes at Congress’s pleasure.”28 This 
new brand of federalism, which Gluck has labeled “intrastatutory 
 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 
123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (“You might think that a ‘nationalist 
school of federalism’ is a contradiction in terms. It isn’t.”). 
26. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001). 
27. Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as 
the New Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) 
to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1049 (2015) 
[hereinafter Gluck, New Federalism]. See also Theodore W. Ruger, ‘Our 
Federalism’ Moves Indoors 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 283, 284-285 
(2013) (“[T]his binary toggle is a far-from-realistic depiction of American 
federalism as it has operated for at least half a century.”). 
28. Gluck, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 1049. Professor Gluck has 
developed this argument in a series of papers. See generally Abbe R. 
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE 
L. J. 534, 540 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism]; Abbe 
R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014) 
[hereinafter Gluck, [National] Federalism]; Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism 
from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned 
Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2013) [hereinafter 
Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes]. 
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federalism” or “national federalism,”29 stems specifically from 
Congress’s decisions to delegate the administration of federal schemes 
to the states. This notion of federalism—which this article hereafter will 
refer to simply as “federalism”—is expansive, and encompasses a range 
of distinct federal-state arrangements.30 
In applying this federalist framework to the specific context of 
occupational licensing, this paper explores how it can be used to 
overcome the institutional and political economy factors that have 
served to entrench the problems in the existing regulatory apparatus. 
This emphasis differs from that of Gluck, who focuses on how state 
administration of federal law can both serve national ends and 
effectuate traditional federalist values, as well as on the implications of 
these arrangements for legal doctrine.31 It also is distinct from much of 
the existing literature on federalism and public choice, which tends to 
focus on questions of how—and to what extent—federalism doctrine 
should incorporate public choice theory and on how public choice 
dynamics support or undermine potential justifications for federal 
intervention.32 
 
29. Gluck, [National] Federalism, supra note 28, at 1998. See also Gerken, 
supra note 25, at 1893-94 (“Too often federalism scholars have treated 
sovereignty and autonomy as if they were the only forms of state 
power . . . They’ve neglected the different but equally important forms of 
state power that are at the heart of the nationalist school’s work on 
federalism: The power states enjoy as national government’s agents.”). 
Edward Rubin refers to this relationship between the federal government 
and the states as “decentralization,” and distinguishes it federalism. See 
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative 
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2085-86 (2005) (contrasting 
decentralization, a “managerial strategy” in which “the central 
government . . . decides how decisionmaking authority will be divided 
between itself and the geographic subdivisions and when that allocation 
will be changed,” with federalism, which “grants subsidiary units a final 
say in certain areas.”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: 
Some Notes on A National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-915 
(1994) (distinguishing between decentralization and federalism, and 
arguing that “many standard arguments advanced for federalism are 
clearly nothing more than policy arguments for decentralization.”). 
30. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 540 (“[T]he typically 
undifferentiated category of ‘cooperative federalism’ has far more internal 
nuances than we currently acknowledge.”). 
31. See, e.g., Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1756; 
see also Gerken, supra note 25, at 1893 (arguing that “federalism can be 
a tool for improving national politics, strengthening a national polity, 
bettering national policymaking, entrenching national norms, 
consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”). 
32. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE & PUBLIC LAW 207, 207 (Daniel A. Farber 
& Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (“The public choice literature on 
federalism and its near-relation, localism, is voluminous in size but narrow 
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The article shows that this federalist approach is more feasible than 
two alternatives: either appealing to state governments to reform their 
own licensing regimes, or alternatively, calling on the federal 
government to simply preempt state licensing laws. Proposals in the 
first category (dual federalist proposals) appeal to state governments to 
restructure their licensing regimes, but often do not acknowledge states’ 
lack of incentives to enact sufficient reforms.33 By contrast, proposals 
in the second category advocate that the federal government should 
step in and preempt large swaths of state law, but they do not take 
into account the institutional and political challenges involved in such 
an approach.34 
This article evaluates both of these approaches and concludes that 
they are implausible and that federalism represents the best path 
toward reforming licensing. Some amount of federal intervention is 
necessary because states lack the incentives to experiment with large-
scale licensing reforms on their own; each state’s licensing laws impose 
externalities on the citizens of other states and on the national labor 
market; and states face collective action problems.35 Although this 
might seem to support federal preemption, a federalist approach is in 
fact more viable: it is more flexible and capable of overcoming interest 
group opposition and it obviates Congress’s historical unwillingness to 
repeal large areas of state law. Moreover, a federalist approach has 
important functional advantages over full-scale federal preemption, 
including encouraging experimentation in the face of policy uncertainty 
and making use of states’ administrative experience.36 
 
in focus . . . Most of this literature revolves around the idea of mobility 
between competing subnational jurisdictions.”). See, e.g., Robert D. 
Cooter and Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 161-62 (2010); Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race to the 
Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1210, 1212 (1992). 
33. Schleicher, supra note 21, at 149 (“A too-easy answer is that states 
and localities should simply fix the problem by changing their policies. 
These governments created the problem, the argument goes, so they 
should fix it. But it is not so easy.”) (citing Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743 
(2013)). 
34. Philip Weiser terms this latter type of proposal as “preemptive 
federalism.” Weiser, supra note 26, at 665-66 (“Preemptive federalism, 
like dual federalism, views the federal government and the states as two 
separate spheres, but instead of leaving room for state regulation, it 
preempts all state authority and supplants it with a unitary federal 
regime.”). 
35. See infra Part IV.B. 
36. See infra Part IV.C. 
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A federalist approach is not only theoretically viable, but also the 
federal government has already begun to adopt such an approach—
albeit in an ad hoc limited fashion. Even these limited steps have the 
potential to improve access to health care, if recognized and scaled up. 
Yet some of these federal actions, and the ways in which they have 
begun to influence licensing requirements for health care providers, have 
hitherto largely gone unrecognized.37 
Although this article focuses specifically on licensing requirements 
for health care providers, the analyses and conclusions in this paper are 
relevant for other areas of licensing, as well as for other kinds of state 
regulation that also deliver economic rents and have nationwide 
economic externalities. There is a growing recognition among 
researchers and policymakers that state and local regulatory policies on 
subjects such as occupational licensing, land-use regulation, and non-
compete agreements have important economic implications for the 
United States as a whole.38 For instance, according to one study, 
stringent land use regulations in “high productivity” cities like New 
York and San Francisco lowered overall US growth by thirty-six 
percent from 1964 to 2009.39 Other research suggests that land-use 
regulations have played an important role in the rise of economic 
inequality.40 This article provides a general framework for how 
policymakers can address these issues, and explores some of the specific 
 
37. See, e.g., Ruger, supra note 27, at 285 (“Some crucial areas of health care 
that have for decades been unquestionably fair game for federal regulation 
under the post-New Deal commerce clause, like the practice of medicine 
by individual physicians, have nonetheless gone entirely unregulated by 
Congress.”). 
38. See, e.g., OFFICE ECON. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, NON-COMPETE 
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016); 
Furman, supra note 15, at 1-2; Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality 
Puzzle, 33 DEMOCRACY (2014), available at https://democracyjournal.org/ 
magazine/33/the-inequality-puzzle/. (“Probably the two most important 
steps that public policy can take with respect to wealth inequality are the 
strengthening of financial regulation to more fully eliminate implicit and 
explicit subsidies to financial activity, and an easing of land-use 
restrictions that cause the real estate of the rich in major metropolitan 
areas to keep rising in value.”); Ilya Somin, Time to Get Moving on 
Making It Easier for Americans to Move, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY BLOG (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/23/time-to-get-moving-on-making-
it-easier-for-americans-to-move (describing an “increasing cross-
ideological consensus among experts in the field” that land-use regulations 
and occupational licensing represent important problems). 
39. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial 
Misallocation 11 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1 (2019). 
40. See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income 
Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76 (2017). 
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tools that the federal government has at its disposal to affect state 
regulation, short of outright preemption. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview 
of the occupational licensing system in the United States, including 
states’ legal authority to license workers, and their history of doing so. 
Part II explores some of the problems with this system, in particular 
focusing on how licensing requirements for health care providers serve 
to impede access to health care. Part III examines several recent steps 
that the federal government has taken to reform licensing restrictions 
for health care providers which illustrate a federalist approach to 
licensing reform. Part IV compares the federalist approach to 
alternative proposals  that either rely primarily on state-level reforms 
or call for federal preemption, and concludes that these alternative 
approaches are inadequate. It evaluates the justifications for federal 
intervention and outlines several practical and normative advantages of 
this federalist approach over full-scale federal preemption. 
I. Licensing and Its Origins 
A. Structure and Function 
Occupational licensing statutes typically have several components: 
they offer a definition of the relevant profession (though often that 
statutory definition can be quite broad and vague);41 they provide that 
it is unlawful to practice, attempt to practice, or hold oneself out as 
practicing in that profession without a license;42 they enumerate certain 
educational, training, and testing requirements to obtain a license; they 
specify the range of services professionals are allowed to offer—their so-
called “scope of practice”—along with any conditions that are attached 
to these services; they enumerate disciplinary penalties for those who 
violate these standards and procedures for enforcing such violations; 
and they usually establish a state licensing board to interpret and 
enforce the act.43 
 
41. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (West 2019) (quoted in Sandra 
Johnson, Structure of Governmental Oversight of Quality in Healthcare, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK U.S. HEALTH L. 502-503 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison 
K. Hoffman, & William M. Sage eds., 1st ed., Oxford University Press 
2017)) (defining the “practice of medicine” as including “the diagnosis, 
treatment, correction, or prevention of any disease, ailment, defect, injury, 
infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition of human beings; the 
suggestion, recommendation, or prescription or administration of any 
form of treatment, without limitation; [and] the performing of any kind 
of surgical operation upon a human being, including tattooing”). 
42. See, e.g, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West 2019); 63 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS STAT. ANN. § 422 (West 2018). 
43. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 490; BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH 
LAW 6 (3d ed. 2015); TIMOTHY S. JOST, Introduction—Regulation of the 
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States have delegated authority to set and enforce licensing 
restriction to licensing boards, which in turn are largely populated by 
members of licensed professions.44 These boards are charged with 
“serv[ing] as gatekeepers to determine the qualifications and 
competence of applicants . . . see[ing] that standards are adhered to by 
practitioners, and when necessary, adjudicat[ing] disputes between the 
public and members of the regulated occupation.”45 The fact that many 
of these boards are primarily composed of members of the licensed 
professions presents an obvious conflict of interest, as these 
professionals have an incentive to insulate themselves from competition 
by erecting excessive barriers to entry and to be lenient when enforcing 
violations against their peers.46 
B. History 
Physicians were among the earliest professions to be licensed, with 
a number of states establishing medical licensing laws prior to the 
Revolutionary War.47 The early licensing laws were “primarily 
honorific”—they typically did not regulate entry into the profession or 
establish minimum educational standards, and they were rarely 
enforced.48 In the early 1800s, states began to pass measures designed 
 
Healthcare Professions, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONS 2-5 (1997). 
44. Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1570 (finding that “of the 1,790 total 
[licensing] boards [in the United States], 1,515, or 85 percent, are required 
by statute to be comprised of a majority of currently licensed 
professionals, active in the very profession the board regulates.”); Aaron 
Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1103 
(2014) (surveying all occupational licensing boards—including, but not 
limited to—health care professions in Florida and Tennessee, and finding 
that “license-holders active in the profession have a majority on 90% of 
boards in Florida and 93% of boards in Tennessee.”). C.f. David Swankin, 
The Role of the Public Member on Licensing Boards, FEDERATION FORUM 
(Fall 2010), https://www.fsbpt.org/download/Forum_Fall2010_ 
PublicMember.pdf (noting that in California, all non-health licensing 
boards have a majority of public members). 
45. SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 14-15. 
46. CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 1 (1990); FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 
4; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 13; Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 
1111; Alan Levine et al., State Medical Boards Fail to Discipline Doctors 
with Hospital Actions Against Them, PUB. CITIZEN at 14 (2011), 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/1937.pdf. 
47. Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 76, 88-89 (2013). 
48. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44 
(1982). 
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to render their medical licensing laws more effective, but shortly 
thereafter, many states weakened or repealed their laws in response to 
a backlash from advocates promoting “medical freedom.”49 
After the Civil War, there was a “second wave” of physician 
licensing, and states one after another began to pass exclusionary 
licensing laws that punished unlicensed practice by fine or 
imprisonment.50 These laws expanded beyond traditionally-licensed 
professions such as physicians and dentists to professions such as 
accountants and nurses.51 What drove this expansion is a matter of 
some scholarly debate:52 some have argued that it primarily represented 
an attempt to limit competition and increase market power;53 others 
have found evidence that it was driven by a desire to exclude low-
quality practitioners in the face of advances in science and technology 
that made it more difficult for consumers to assess practitioners’ quality 
on their own.54 
At first, even these new exclusionary licensing laws still did not 
substantially restrict entry into most professions, either because the 
requirements they imposed were weak or the licensing boards they 
established were ineffective.55 Charles Eliot, who was President of 
 
49. Grossman, supra note 47, at 102-04. 
50. Id. at 129. 
51. Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise 
of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing 
Regulation. 65 J. ECON. HIST., 723, 730-731 (2005). 
52. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: 
Regulation, Management, or the Market? 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828 (1995) 
(“The nineteenth century origins of physician licensure have been 
thoroughly studied, and a variety of theories have emerged as to why 
licensure was in fact adopted.”). 
53. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 48, at 103; Samuel L. Baker, Physician 
Licensure Laws in the United States, 1865-1915, 39 J. HIST. MED. ALLIED 
SCI. 173, 192 (1984). 
54. See RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-
1965, 43-44 (1967); Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 729 (finding that 
licensing restrictions were adopted during the Progressive ERA in 
response to developments which made it harder for consumers to evaluate 
provider quality). These explanations are not necessarily mutally 
exclusive. See CHRISTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH—
THE PUBLIC CREATION OF THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 14-15 
(2015) (describing how the American Medical Association harnessed 
scientific discoveries at the end of the 19th century to make licensing 
standards more stringent, improving physicians’ quality and increasing 
their market power). 
55. Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 726. 
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Harvard from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century,56 
reportedly “remarked that in those days anybody could ‘walk into a 
medical school from the street’ . . . [adding] that many who did walk in 
‘could barely read and write.’”57 In the decades that followed, however, 
state legislatures began to ratchet up the requirements to obtain a 
license, for example, by requiring medical schools to lengthen their 
curricula and requiring doctors to pass an exam.58 
As the twentieth century progressed, many other professions sought 
and were granted licensure by state governments.59 By the middle of 
the 20th century, states had enacted more than 1,200 statutes for at 
least 75 different occupations.60 Over 300 occupations were licensed by 
1973.61 A 1994 study found that over 800 occupations were licensed by 
at least one of the 50 states.62 More recent evidence has confirmed that 
the expansion of licensing has continued to the present day. Morris 
Kleiner and Alan Krueger found that the proportion of the workforce 
licensed at the state level grew from less than 5 percent in the early 
1950s to 29% by 2008.63 More recent evidence based on a larger survey 
sample suggests that a slightly lower proportion of the workforce – 
closer to one-quarter – holds an occupational license.64 
C. Legal Authority and Policy Justifications 
States’ constitutional authority to license professions stems from 
the police power, which under the Tenth Amendment reserves to the 
states the authority to pass regulations that further the public’s health, 
 
56. Charles William Eliot, HARV. U., https://www.harvard.edu/about-
harvard/harvard-glance/history-presidency/charles-william-eliot (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
57. Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
6, 9 (1976); see also STARR, supra note 48, at 102. 
58. See STARR, supra note 48, at 104-05; Baker, supra note 53, at 189-90. 
59. SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 16 (“Between 1910 and 1919 
approximately 130 statutes regulating 14 [health-related] professions were 
passed.”) 
60. Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 725-726. 
61. COX & FOSTER, supra note 46, at 3 (citing D. L. Martin, Will the Sun Set 
on Occupational Licensing?, 53 ST. GOV. 63 (1980)). 
62. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, supra note 2, at 190 (citing COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS LICENSED BY THE 
STATES, PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS (1994)). 
63. Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market, supra note 11, at S176; Morris M. 
Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational 
Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 677-678 (2010) [hereinafter Kleiner 
& Krueger, Prevalence and Effects]. 
64. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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safety, and general welfare.65 The primary justification for licensure—
and the one that has been expressly recognized by the courts—is to 
protect the public from inept or dangerous practitioners.66 Courts have 
historically been very deferential in reviewing states’ authority to 
invoke the police power, typically upholding legislation under this 
power if its contribution to health and public safety is “at least fairly 
debatable.”67 While there have been some recent successful 
constitutional claims brought against licensing regimes,68 courts have 
generally been unwilling to strike down licensing schemes as 
unconstitutional.69 
 
65. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 5. 
66. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). (“The power of the 
State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to 
prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to 
secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well 
as of deception and fraud.”). See also Thomas v. Collins, 65 S.Ct. 315, 
329 (1945), (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The modern state owes and 
attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for 
one purpose or another to obtain its money. When one does so through 
the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the 
public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, 
or against unauthorized representation of agency. A usual method of 
performing this function is through a licensing system.”); Timothy S. Jost, 
Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION 
OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 1, 20 (1992). But see Nick Robinson, 
The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
1903 (2018) (proposing other justifications for occupational licensing 
besides consumer protection). 
67. Johnson, supra note 41, at 494; FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 15; 
MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1207-08 (8th ed. 
2013) (“Courts uniformly have upheld state licensing regulations so long 
as they are rationally related to serving some legitimate state interest.”) 
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). 
See also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. 
of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000); Sherman v. Crynsc, 786 
N.E.2d 139 (Ill. 2003). 
68. See, e.g., Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 
73 (Tex. 2015) (holding that a Texas law requiring eyebrow-threaders to 
obtain a cosmetology license violated the Due Process Clause); St. Joseph 
Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-227 (5th Cir. 2013) (invalidating a 
Louisiana law prohibiting unlicensed casket sales). 
69. See Blevins, supra note 21, at 876 (“[C]onstitutional law provides a weak 
doctrinal toolkit to challenge occupational licensing laws. Courts can only 
invalidate them by ignoring decades of firmly established, and strongly 
deferential, precedent.”); Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1134 
(“Constitutional suits alone cannot curtail the anticompetitive effects of 
professional licensing . . . [because] they are almost impossible to win.”); 
Joseph Sanderson, Note, Don’t Bury the Competition: Occupational 
Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE. J. REG. 455, 456 (2014) 
(“With a handful of exceptions . . . courts have upheld even the most 
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The justification for licensure has the most force in fields such as 
health care, where the public lacks the information or expertise to 
properly evaluate the competence of practitioners, and where 
incompetent practitioners can inflict severe harm.70 If consumers cannot 
distinguish between high- and low-quality practitioners, then there is 
less incentive for practitioners to undertake the costly investments 
necessary to improve the quality of their services, which in turn reduces 
the average quality of the service being provided.71 In addition, in some 
contexts, low-quality practitioners can inflict harm not only on the 
persons who paid for their services, but also on third parties as well.72 
Nevertheless, many economists and legal scholars have expressed 
skepticism that licensing improves quality, arguing that its primary 
purpose is to limit competition and drive up the wages of licensed 
professionals.73 They point to several factors, including: the dearth of 
 
egregiously protectionist licensing schemes as constitutional.”). But see 
David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful 
Occupation: A Brighter Future Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J. 287, 287 (2016) 
(“Recent precedent . . . suggests that courts are becoming more protective 
of what has traditionally been considered a subset of liberty of contract: 
the right to pursue an occupation.”); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-Stamps 
into Gavels: A Fresh Look at Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J. 304, 
305 (2016) (arguing that “several trends in constitutional scholarship and 
doctrine suggest that a transformation of that jurisprudence may be closer 
at hand than many would suppose.”). 
70. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 941, 967 (1963) (“The choice among these 
alternatives [licensure, certification, and laissez-faire approaches to 
regulating occupations] in any given case depends on the degree of 
difficulty consumers have in making the choice unaided, and on the 
consequences of errors of judgment. It is the general social consensus, 
clearly, that the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable. The 
certification proposal never seems to have been discussed seriously.”). 
71. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
72. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, supra note 2, at 192 (“[I]t is argued that 
in some cases, a poor quality service is not just a matter between employer 
and employee. A doctor who makes a bad diagnosis may cause a 
widespread epidemic. A boilermaker who installs a furnace incorrectly 
may cause a building to catch fire, injuring or killing many persons. In 
this sense, requiring a practitioner to be trained at a minimum level 
recognizes a form of regulation which may produce positive social 
payoffs.”). 
73. Gellhorn, supra note 57, at 11 (“That restricting access is the real purpose, 
and not merely a side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to 
institute licensing schemes can scarcely be doubted.”); Law & Kim, supra 
note 51, at 724 (“The dominant view today is that the regulatory licensing 
process has been captured by industry to erect entry restrictions for its 
own benefit.”); Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and 
Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 165 (1978) (“It is 
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empirical evidence showing that occupational licensing improves 
quality;74 the fact that licensing requirements often do not bear any 
relation to competency or to the specific demands of a profession;75 the 
fact that licensing requirements often vary dramatically from state to 
state;76 the practice of “grandfathering” current practitioners when a 
profession becomes licensed (allowing them to practice even when they 
do not meet all the standards imposed by the new licensing law);77 and 
the evidence that a profession’s political power is an important 
determinant of whether or not it is licensed, as well as the 
restrictiveness of licensing laws.78 
Although many licensing requirements likely do little to improve 
quality, some of the critiques of licensing may be overstating the 
evidence. While it is true that most empirical scholarship does not find 
that licensing requirements improve quality, much of this scholarship 
has focused on relatively small discrepancies among states’ licensing 
policies for professions that have long been subject to licensure.79 By 
 
widely believed among economists that barriers to entry into medical 
practice have been erected for the economic advantage of those practicing 
medicine.”). 
74. See, e.g., WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 (reviewing several empirical 
studies on the impact of licensing on quality); Edlin & Haw, supra note 
44, at 1116 (“The economic research on quality of service as a function of 
licensing paints a murky picture.”). 
75. See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO 
WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
7, 8 (2nd ed. 2017) (finding that licensing laws on average require 
cosmetologists to have over 10 times as many days of training as 
emergency medical technicians.); Gellhorn, supra note 57, at 13-19 (citing 
numerous examples, such as citizenship and residency requirements); Paul 
J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 219-220 (2016) (“There also appears to be 
no rational relationship between the stringency of the licensing 
requirements and the demands placed on practitioners.”). 
76. See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 75, at 7 (finding that four states 
require four years of experience to obtain a residential landscape 
contractor license, while forty other states require no experience). 
77. SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 13; Kleiner et al., A Proposal, supra 
note 14, at 8. 
78. See, e.g., Benjamin J. McMichael, The Demand for Healthcare 
Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing 
Laws, 84 S. ECON. J. 297, (2017); Chris Paul, Physician Licensure 
Legislation and the Quality of Medical Care, 12(4) ATLANTIC ECON. J. 18, 
20-21 (1984); William D. White, Mandatory Licensing of Registered 
Nurses: Introduction and Impact, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND 
REGULATION 47, 57-61 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). 
79. WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 60 (“[M]ost of the empirical evidence on 
licensing comes from looking at very specific examples. While the 
aforementioned studies indicate that occupational licensing does not 
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contrast, the few empirical studies that focus on the initial adoption of 
licensing laws for health care professions find that they have in fact had 
important impacts on consumers’ health and safety.80 
Moreover, even some of the fiercest critics of licensing concede that 
the justification for licensing is stronger in health care.81 Thus, in the 
context of health care, most reform proposals have tended to focus on 
reforming specific aspects of the existing licensing system, rather than 
getting rid of it altogether.82 
II. The Impact of Licensing on Access to Health Care 
Many of the costs of the current licensing system have been well-
documented. By limiting entry into the licensed profession, licensing 
reduces employment in those professions, thereby increasing the wages 
of licensed professionals and raising the prices that consumers pay for 
services.83 Restrictive rules of practice (known as “scope of practice” 
restrictions) further depress wages for licensed professions subject to 
these restrictions (such as nurses or dental hygienists) and elevate them 
 
guarantee quality improvements, they likewise do not indicate that all 
licensing frameworks fail to increase service quality”). 
80. See, e.g., Mark Anderson et al., The Effect of Occupational Licensing on 
Consumer Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality 27 
(NBER Working Paper No. 22456, 2016); Law & Kim, supra note 51. 
81. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 138 (1962) (“I 
agree that the case for licensure is stronger for medicine than for most 
other fields.”); James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence 
with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public 
Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2010) (“No one 
seriously disputes the need for some form of professional regulation in the 
presence of large information asymmetries and serious spillover effects. In 
most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer to judge the 
quality of her physician or attorney, and these practitioners are unlikely 
to internalize the full costs of their mistakes. Some level of state 
credentialing and regulation makes sense.”); Shirley V. Svorny, Beyond 
Medical Licensure, 38 REG. 26, 26 (2015) (“But when it comes to medical 
professionals, many of the staunchest critics of licensing back off.”). 
82. See infra Part IV. But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 81, at 135-160; Charles 
H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer’s Case 
for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 336-341 (1983); Shirley Svorny, 
Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care, 621 POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2008). 
83. See, e.g., Maya N. Federman, David E. Harrington, & Kathy J. Krynski, 
The Impact of State Licensing Regulations on Low-Skilled Immigrants: 
The Case of Vietnamese Manicurists, 96(2) AM. ECON. REV. 237 (2006); 
Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market, supra note 11; Kleiner & Krueger, 
Prevalence and Effects, supra note 63. 
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for professions not subject to them (such as doctors or dentists).84 
Differences among states’ licensing regimes, combined with a lack of 
reciprocity, make it more difficult for practitioners to relocate or 
practice in multiple states.85 
This article focuses on one problem that has not received as much 
attention: how certain features of current licensure system for health 
care providers impede access to health care without improving quality. 
Namely, excessive scope of practice restrictions prevent health care 
providers such as nurses or dental hygienists from offering services they 
are qualified to provide;86 differences in state licensing requirements, 
which—combined with the requirement that providers be licensed in 
each state in which they practice—make it more difficult for health care 
providers to relocate or use telehealth to deliver services in multiple 
states;87 and the refusal to recognize the training completed overseas by 
foreign health care workers who relocate to the United States.88 
These features of the licensing system limit access to health care by 
making it less affordable, contributing to lengthy wait times, and 
skewing the distribution of health care resources.89 Although the most 
 
84. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1112; Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing 
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a 
Medical Service, 59(2) J.L. & ECON. 261, 261-64 (2016) [hereinafter 
Kleiner et al., Relaxing Requirements]. 
85. See e.g., Johnson & Kleiner, supra note 17, at 1-2, 19. 
86. See, e.g., LEONARD J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., REFORMING HEALTH CARE 
WORKFORCE REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 9-13 (1995); Yong-Fang Kuo et al., States with the Least 
Restrictive Regulations Experienced the Largest Increase in Patients 
Seen by Nurse Practitioners, 32(7) HEALTH AFF. 1236, 1241-42 (2013). 
87. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TELEHEALTH: 
POLICY TRENDS AND CONSIDERATIONS 4 (2015); Amy E. Zilis, The Doctor 
Will Skype You Now: How Changing Physician Licensure 
Requirements Would Clear the Way for Telemedicine to Achieve the 
Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 2012 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 201-
203 (2012). 
88. See, e.g., Dean Baker, Globalization Hurt Factory Workers. Why Not 
Doctors?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ 
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-baker-doctor-protectionism-20161127-story.html; 
Catherine Rampell, Path to United States Practice is Long Slog to Foreign 
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/12/business/economy/long-slog-for-foreign-doctors-to-practice-
in-us.html. 
89. See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-3 (“Despite its laudable 
goals, however, restrictive licensing also produces some negative 
outcomes. Health care professionals and their patients are constrained in 
their choices concerning treatment, for example, and licensure raises the 
costs of health care.”); Baron, supra note 82, at 339 (“Because of its 
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prominent barrier to accessing health care in the United States has long 
been the lack of affordable health insurance,90 surveys find that 
affordability and wait times are substantial impediments to accessing 
care in the United States, even for those who have health insurance.91 
A 2016 study of eleven developed countries by the Commonwealth 
Fund found that U.S. respondents were the most likely to report cost-
related problems in accessing care, and that at least one in five 
Americans waited six days or more to see a doctor or nurse the last 
time they needed care (with low-income Americans especially likely to 
have to wait).92 According to one estimate, Americans spend 2.4 billion 
hours each year making doctors’ visits—only 17% of which is actually 
spent seeing a doctor.93 These challenges are especially acute in some 
geographic areas that have shortages of health care providers, or where 
patients must travel long distances to see a provider.94 
The sections below describe how certain licensure laws hinder access 
to health care through excessive scope of practice restrictions, 
restrictions on telehealth, and limitations on immigrant health care 
providers. 
 
anticompetitive tendencies, licensure has produced higher health care 
costs than those which would prevail in a competitive market.”). 
90. Having health insurance is of course an important component of being 
able to access care. See generally Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health 
Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us, 377 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017) (reviewing several recent empirical 
studies on the effects of health insurance on access to health care and 
health outcomes). 
91. See Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health Reform Issue 
for Ordinary Americans, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/29/affordability-the-most-urgent-
health-reform-issue-for-ordinary-americans/; Sara Heath, Solutions for 
Reducing Healthcare Appointment Wait Times for Patients, XTELLIGENT 
HEALTHCARE MEDIA (Mar. 12, 2018), https://patientengagementhit.com 
/news/solutions-for-reducing-healthcare-appointment-wait-times-for-
patients. 
92. Robin Osborn et al., In New Survey of Eleven Countries, US Adults Still 
Struggle with Access to and Affordability of Health Care, 35 HEALTH AFF. 
2327, 2330 (2016). 
93. Kristin N. Ray et al., Opportunity Costs of Ambulatory Medical Care in 
the United States, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 567 (2015). 
94. Julia Foutz et al., The Role of Medicaid in Rural America, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/the-role-of-medicaid-in-rural-america/; Elizabeth J. Brown et al., 
Racial Disparities in Geographic Access to Primary Care in Philadelphia, 
35 HEALTH AFF. 1374, 1379 (2016). 
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A. Scope of Practice 
Licensure laws limit access to health care by restricting what types 
of services non-physician providers are allowed to provide and 
subjecting them to excessively stringent physician supervision 
requirements.95 Health care providers’ scopes of practice vary widely, 
depending on the profession they pursue. On one end of the spectrum, 
physicians are the only profession whose legal scope-of-practice is “all-
encompassing.”96 State physician practice acts authorize physicians to 
perform any function encompassed by “the practice of medicine,” 
ranging from drawing blood to performing open-heart surgery.97 
Although there are other non-regulatory mechanisms that, in practice, 
serve to prevent physicians from providing services that they are 
unqualified to provide,98 physician organizations have historically 
resisted imposing any legal limitations on their legal scope-of-practice.99 
By contrast, other health care providers, such as nurses and 
physician assistants, have much narrower scopes of practice and are 
often subject to restrictions on their ability to practice or have 
supervision requirements. These restrictions vary dramatically from 
state to state, and occasionally may even vary within a given state.100 
For example, although 22 states and the District of Columbia allow 
Nurse Practitioners (NPs) to provide certain types of health care 
services independently (including diagnosing patients, initiating and 
managing certain conditions, prescribing medications, and referring), 16 
states require that NPs be supervised by a physician to prescribe 
 
95. E. KATHLEEN ADAMS & SARA MARKOWITZ, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN THE 
HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM: REMOVING ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS FOR 
ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, 
THE HAMILTON PROJECT at 6 (2018). 
96. Barbara Safriet, Impediments to Progress in Health Care Workforce 
Policy: License and Practice Laws, 31 INQUIRY 310, 311 (1994) 
[hereinafter Safriet, Impediments]. 
97. Id. 
98. Barbara J. Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of Advanced 
Practice Nurses in Providing Quality, Cost-Effective Health Care, in THE 
FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 443, 453 
(The Nat’l Acads. Press, 2011) (these include “norms deriving from 
common sense and decency, professional ethics and judgment, 
institutional credentialing and voluntary accreditation standards, and 
insurance concerns.”) [hereinafter Safriet, Federal Options]. 
99. See William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary 
Practice, in REGULATING HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 74, 74 (Timothy Jost 
ed., 1992). 
100. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care 
Providers’ Scope of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. REG. 
301, 313-315 (2002) [hereinafter Safriet, Closing the Gap]. 
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medications, and 12 states require NPs to have physician oversight to 
prescribe, diagnose, and treat patients (as of March 2019).101 Similarly, 
while all states require Physician Assistants to be supervised by a 
physician, some states specifically require them to work in the same 
facility as their supervising physicians, while others require only that 
the physician be reachable by phone.102 
A burgeoning body of empirical research suggests that excessive 
scope of practice restrictions limit access to care without improving 
quality. For instance, one study found that more stringent scope-of-
practice restrictions for NPs increase the price of well-child visits 
without any evidence of improved health outcomes.103 Another study 
found that more stringent scope-of-practice restrictions for dental 
hygienists reduces access to dental care.104 Other research found that 
the stringency of scope-of-practice restrictions for Certified Nurse 
Midwives does not affect maternal or infant health outcomes.105 One 
recent study found that broadening prescriptive authority for NPs is 
associated with improvements in patients’ mental health and decreases 
in mortality related to mental health.106 
A wide range of organizations and institutions, including the 
Institute of Medicine, the Pew Health Professions Commission, the 
Rand Corporation, and the FTC, have focused in particular on the 
potential of expanding scope of practice restrictions for Advanced 
Practice Nurses (APNs) (a category of registered nurses who have 
graduate degrees which includes Nurse Practitioners, Registered Nurse 
Anesthetists, Nurse-Midwives, and Clinical Nurse Specialists)107 to 
improve access to both primary care and acute care without sacrificing 
 
101. State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-legislation/state-
practice-environment. 
102. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 33. 
103. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Requirements, supra note 84, at 263. 
104. Tanya Wanchek, Dental Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral 
Healthcare: Assessing the Variation Across the US States, 48 BRITISH J. 
OF INDUS. REL. 706, 723 (2010). 
105. Sara Markowitz et al., Competitive Effects of Scope of Practice 
Restrictions: Public Health or Public Harm?, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 201, 
216 (2017). 
106. Diane Alexander & Molly Schnell, Just What the Nurse Practitioner 
Ordered: Independent Prescriptive Authority and Population Mental 
Health (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. WP-2017-8, 2016). 
107. Advanced Practice Nurses, NURSING LICENSE MAP, 
https://nursinglicensemap.com/advanced-practice-nursing/ (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2019). 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Unlocking Access to Health Care:  A Federalist Approach to Reforming 
Occupational Licensing 
315 
quality.108 Drawing on empirical research finding that the quality of care 
provided by APNs is similar to that provided by physicians for certain 
services,109 these organizations have recommended that states allow 
APNs “to practice to the full extent of their education and training.”110 
B. Telehealth 
Another way in which state licensing impedes access to health care 
without improving quality is by making it more difficult for health care 
providers to practice in multiple states, either remotely via telehealth 
or in-person.111 Through the use of video and data transmission, 
telehealth can allow patients to remotely access consultations, 
diagnoses, and treatments when no providers are readily available 
nearby, or to help providers communicate with each other and manage 
care more efficiently.112 Proponents of telehealth have hailed its 
 
108. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION 
AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014); see 
FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at 11. 
109. See, e.g., R.P. Newhouse et al., Advanced Practice Nurse Outcomes 1990-
2008: A Systematic Review, 29 NURSING ECON. 230, 235 (2011); Julie 
Stanik-Hutt et al., The Quality and Effectiveness of Care Provided by 
Nurse Practitioners, 9 J. NURSE PRACTITIONERS 492, 496 (2013); Mary O. 
Mundinger et al., Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse 
Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
59 (2000). 
110. INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING 
HEALTH 1 (2011) [hereinafter INST. MED.]. See also FINOCCHIO ET AL., 
supra note 86, at 9; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 108, at 38. 
111. This article follows the American Telemedicine Association in using the 
terms telehealth and telemedicine interchangeably. Telemedicine FAQs, 
AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N (Sept. 20, 2017), 
http://www.americantelemed.org/main/about/about-telemedicine/ 
telemedicine-faqs. Others use both terms to describe “the use of 
technology to exchange information to improve a patient’s health status,” 
but understand telemedicine to refer to only direct clinical services and 
the term telehealth to refer to a broader scope of health-related services 
(e,g., patient education, remote monitoring, etc.). Tracy A. Lustig, The 
Role of Telehealth in an Evolving Health Care Environment: Workshop 
Summary, INST. MED. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 3 (2012) (citing Dr. Thomas S. 
Nesbitt). 
112. According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
term telehealth encompasses four basic functions: (1) synchronous 
communication—live video interactions, such as those between a patient 
and a provider; (2) store-and-forward technology—the transmission of 
medical data, videos, and digital images to a provider; (3) remote patient 
monitoring—the transmission of “personal health and medical data 
collection from an individual in one location, which is transmitted to a 
provider in a different location”; and (4) mobile health—”[s]martphone 
apps designed to foster health and well-being.” U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
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potential to change the delivery of health care as “transcendent.”113 It 
holds particular promise for improving access to care, especially for 
people who live far away from major health care centers and for people 
afflicted with chronic conditions who require frequent consultation with 
health care providers.114 
Early evaluations of telehealth programs have been encouraging, 
though they also suggest that telehealth should not be viewed as a 
panacea. One study of an electronic exchange system linking primary 
care providers and specialists at San Francisco General Hospital found 
that around 20% of specialist consultations were resolved without 
requiring an in-person visit, and that wait times were dramatically 
reduced for those patients who did require an in-person visit.115 A study 
of Teladoc, a direct-to-consumer telehealth company, found that its 
service made accessing care more convenient, though it also had the 
potential to further stress overtaxed health care systems by leading to 
greater utilization of health care services.116 
Perhaps the most important barrier to more widespread adoption 
of telehealth is state-specific occupational licensing regimes.117 As many 
 
HUM. SERVICES, E-HEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE 5 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES]. 
113. Carl F. Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for 
Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
55, 56 (2012). 
114. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, supra note 112, at 4; Bill Frist, 
Telemedicine: A Solution to Address the Problems of Cost, Access, and 
Quality, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jul. 23, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2015/07/23/telemedicine-a-solution-to-address-the-problems-of-
cost-access-and-quality/. But see Lori Uscher-Pines & Ateev Mehrotra, 
Telehealth Alone Will Not Increase Health Care Access for the 
Underserved, RAND BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.rand.org/ 
blog/2016/12/telehealth-alone-will-not-increase-health-care-access.html 
(concluding that expanding telehealth will generate new demand for 
health care services that will require in-person visits, and proposing 
several potential solutions.). 
115. Alice Hm Chen et al., eReferral—A New Model for Integrated Care, 368 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2450, 2451 (2013). 
116. Uscher-Pines & Mehrotra, supra note 114; J. Scott Ashwood et al., Direct-
To-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but Does Not 
Decrease Spending, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 485 (2017). 
117. See, e.g., Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Telehealth Among US Hospitals: 
Several Factors, Including State Reimbursement and Licensure Policies, 
Influence Adoption, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207 (2014) (finding that states 
which require out-of-state providers to have a special license to provide 
telehealth have lower rates of telehealth services); Ameringer, supra note 
113, at 57 (“But serious obstacles to the implementation of telemedicine 
exist. Among the most significant of these are state-based licensure 
schemes.”); Heather L. Daly, Telemedicine: The Invisible Legal Barriers 
to the Health Care of the Future 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 90 (2000) 
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as four out of five states require health care providers to be licensed in 
the state where the patient is located, so that health care providers who 
provide telehealth to patients in multiple states must have separate 
licenses for each state.118 Some states also require providers to have an 
in-person consultation with the patient before providing services 
remotely through telehealth.119 A health care provider who is licensed 
in one state but practices in a state in which she does not have a license 
may face loss or suspension of her license, civil damages, or criminal 
penalties.120 In some states, in-state physicians may also be liable if they 
seek a consultation from an out-of-state physician.121 
 
(“[A]pplication requirements, inconsistencies in the laws applicable to 
health care providers, and the lack of coordination make licensing an 
effective barrier to the expansion of telemedicine.”); Diane E. Hoffman & 
Virginia Rowthorn, Legal Impediments to the Diffusion of Telemedicine, 
14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2011) (“State laws regarding 
physician licensure present the greatest challenge to the interstate practice 
of telemedicine.”); Peter D. Jacobson & Elizabeth Selvin, Licensing 
Telemedicine: The Need for a National System, 6 TELEMEDICINE J. & 
E-HEALTH 429, 431 (2000) (“The current state-based medical licensure 
system may constitute one of the most significant barriers to the wide 
dissemination of telemedicine.”); Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note 
100, at 315-316 (“[T]he crazy quilt of licensure laws has repeatedly been 
identified as the greatest legal impediment to ‘telepractice’ or ‘telehealth’ 
systems that would allow HCPs [health care providers] to monitor, 
diagnose, and treat patients at distant sites through telecommunications 
technology”); Kathleen M. Vybomy, Legal and Political Issues Facing 
Telemedicine, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 66 (1996) (“Perhaps the most 
significant barrier to a nationwide telemedical practice is the traditional 
system of state-by-state physician licensing”). Other barriers to the 
adoption of telehealth besides licensing include resistance from insurers to 
reimburse providers for telehealth services, and resistance from providers 
to offer them. Austin Frakt, You Mean I Don’t Have to Show Up? The 
Promise of Telemedicine, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/upshot/you-mean-i-dont-have-to-
show-up-the-promise-of-telemedicine.html. 
118. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, supra note 112, at 7-8. 
119. Lustig, supra note 111, at 18. See, e.g., Teladoc Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 
112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 534 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (challenging a 2015 Texas 
Medical Board rule requiring an in-person evaluation before a physician 
could issue a prescription). 
120. See Joy E. Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via 
Telecommunications Will Save Lives, But Can Congress Answer the 
Call?: Federal Preemption of State Licensure Requirements Under 
Congressional Commerce Clause Authority & Spending Power, 22 VT. L. 
REV. 231, 233 (1997); Thomas R. McLean, The Future of Telemedicine 
and Its Faustian Reliance on Regulatory Trade Barriers for Protection, 
16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 463 (2006) (“[I]n the current market, when a 
state finds a provider who uses cyberspace to avoid compliance with its 
licensure act, that state will aggressively prosecute the provider.”). 
121. Matak, supra note 120, at 242 (citations omitted). 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Unlocking Access to Health Care:  A Federalist Approach to Reforming 
Occupational Licensing 
318 
Although the basic education and training requirements for 
physician licensure are similar across states, physicians face an array of 
administrative and financial barriers to getting and maintaining licenses 
in multiple states.122 For example, state licensing boards may require 
that applicants complete additional testing or coursework; provide 
references, transcripts, and a picture; pay fees; or participate in an in-
person interview.123 Many states also require physicians to have medical 
malpractice coverage in order to hold a license, so providers practicing 
in multiple states may have to comply with multiple insurance codes.124 
Fulfilling these procedures can be time-consuming and costly. These 
factors may help to explain why, according to a 2010 HRSA report, 
only 22% of licensed physicians hold multiple state licenses.125 Such 
state-level requirements are also difficult to justify from a quality 
perspective, since medical practice standards are evidence-based and 
medical training standards are set nationally.126 
State licensure presents even more formidable barriers for 
professions such as nurses and physician assistants seeking to offer 
services through telehealth, since they are subject as well to scope-of-
practice and supervision restrictions that vary widely by state.127 For 
example, a nurse who can prescribe medications or diagnose patients 
independently in one state may be subject to physician supervision 
requirements in another. Providers must be careful to abide by the 
specific scope-of-practice and supervision requirements in each state in 
which they operate, or risk disciplinary sanctions. Applicants may also 
have to wait a substantial amount of time for the licensing board to 
process their application. For example, one report found that nursing 
school graduates in California had to wait as long as 24 weeks for their 
licenses to be processed, while experienced nurses from out-of-state also 
waited for months to get a California license.128 
 
122. Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate 
Telemedicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1, 18 (1999). 
123. Janet M. Torpy, Medical Licensure, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1268, 1268 
(2010). 
124. See McLean, supra note 120, at 464. 
125. MARY K. WAKEFIELD, HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., TELEHEALTH 
LICENSURE REPORT 1, 26 (2010). 
126. See Robert Kocher et. al., Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing 
Across State Lines, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-without-state-borders-
practicing-across-state-lines/. 
127. Sulentic, supra note 122, at 19 (“The barriers facing a nonphysican who 
wishes to offer his services in a different state through telemedicine may 
in fact be impossible to surmount.”). 
128. Eryn Brown, Licensing Logjam for California Nurses, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2016), http://khn.org/news/licensing-logjam-for-
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States have taken some limited steps to address these obstacles. 
Most states have a “consultation exception” that allows out-of-state 
health care providers to “‘practice medicine in that state at the behest 
and in consultation with a referring physician’ practicing within the 
state.”129 Other states allow out-of-state physicians to procure a 
“limited license” or “special purpose” license for telemedicine, which 
essentially allows out-of-state providers to provide a limited set of 
services, such as teleradiology, without a full license.130 A few states 
have taken more dramatic steps: for example, Alabama and 
Pennsylvania have reciprocity agreements with other states, granting 
in-state licenses to other states that accept their licenses.131 Yet on the 
whole, these steps have been either too limited in scope or not 
sufficiently widespread to remove the barriers that licensing presents 
for telehealth.132 
C. Foreign-Trained Providers 
Licensure also impedes access to care without improving quality by 
subjecting nearly all foreign-trained health care providers to the same 
burdensome licensing requirements, even if they are highly-trained and 
experienced. State medical practice acts require that all medical 
graduates seeking licensure no matter how well-trained and educated 
they are, must overcome a daunting set of obstacles in order to practice 
legally in the United States. These include passing the three steps of 
the United States Medical Licensing Examination (a process which 
usually takes years to complete and requires paying thousands of dollars 
in fees) and completing a residency in the United States (which also 
takes years and has a limited number of vacancies).133 States vary in 
the length of the residency they require international medical graduates 
 
california-nurses/ (“‘We can’t license our graduates,’ McFarland 
lamented. ‘Nurses want to retire, they want to train the next generation. 
We have hospitals investing in residency programs and they can’t start 
the new nurses they want to hire. At the end of the day, who’s 
suffering? Our nurse graduates and our patients.’”). 
129. Zilis, supra note 87, at 208 (quoting Jon Linkous, Telemedicine and 
State Licensure, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://americantelemed.blogspot.com/2010/04/telemedicine-and-
state-licensure.html). 
130. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 10; Zilis, supra note 87, at 209-210. 
131. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 87, at 16. 
132. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 9-10. 
133. See Brenton D. Peterson et al., Doctors with Borders: Occupational 
Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High Skill Migration, 160 PUB. CHOICE 
45, 51 (2014); Fees and Payment, EDUC. COMM’N FOR FOREIGN MED. 
GRADUATES, https://www.ecfmg.org/fees/index.html (Dec. 31, 2018). 
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to complete in order to get a license.134 Only physicians who were 
trained in Canada are exempt from having to complete a residency 
again in the United States.135 
This contrasts with the process in some other countries, which 
allows foreign providers to obtain a license more easily if they meet 
certain indicators of competency or training. For example, some 
Canadian provinces allow immigrant physicians to practice family 
medicine in the Canada without doing a residency there, if they 
completed similar postgraduate work in certain other countries.136 New 
Zealand automatically allows physicians from the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Canada to practice in New Zealand.137 
The licensing process in the United States likely deters many high-
quality foreign-trained providers from practicing here.138 According to a 
2014 report by former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick’s 
Advisory Council for Refugees and Immigrants, foreign-trained health 
care providers “are 5 times more likely to be underemployed and twice 
as likely to work in a different field than U.S.-trained providers.”139 One 
of the report’s authors estimated that there could be more than 60,000 
foreign-trained doctors living in the United States who are not licensed 
to practice.140 Research finds that patients in the United States who are 
cared for by international medical graduates have similar or better 
outcomes than patients who are cared for by U.S. medical graduates.141 
Foreign medical graduates disproportionately practice primary care and 
 
134. Peterson et al., supra note 133. 
135. Rampell, supra note 88. 
136. Id. 
137. McLean, supra note 120, at 504 (citing Med. Counsel of N.Z., Policy on 
Registration in New Zealand (May 2004), http://www.mcnz.org.nz/ 
Default.aspx?tabid=983). 
138. See Peterson et al., supra note 133, at 50; Simón Rios, For Doctors 
Trained Abroad, Challenges to Practicing Medicine Often 
Insurmountable, WBUR (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/ 
commonhealth/2016/09/30/foreign-trained-doctors-challenges. 
139. GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES & IMMIGRANTS TASK 
FORCE ON IMMIGRANT HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 
RX FOR STRENGTHENING MASSACHUSETTS’ ECONOMY AND HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 1, 12 (2014). 
140. Rios, supra note 138. 
141. See, e.g., John J. Norcini et al., Evaluating the Quality of Care Provided 
by Graduates of International Medical Schools, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1461, 
1466-67 (2010); Yusake Tsugawa et al., Quality of Care Delivered by 
General Internists in US Hospitals Who Graduated from Foreign Versus 
US Medical Schools: Observational Study, 356 BRIT. MED. J. 1 (2017). 
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practice in underserved communities in the United States that lack 
adequate access to health care.142 
III. A Federalist Approach 
Over the past few years, the federal government has taken several 
steps to improve access to health care by encouraging states to reform 
their licensing requirements for health care providers. It has eased 
licensing restrictions for health care providers working at military 
hospitals and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), over which the 
federal government has jurisdiction. It has provided funding for states 
and professional bodies to improve access to telemedicine. The FTC has 
stepped up its antitrust enforcement and advocacy efforts against 
licensing boards that engage in anticompetitive conduct. Finally, the 
ACA has indirectly placed pressure on states to implement further 
reforms through expanding health insurance and promoting delivery 
system reforms. 
These measures represent a range of different federal-state 
dynamics. For instance, the funding schemes fit into the classic 
paradigm of “cooperative federalism,” in which the federal government 
offers states fiscal support to enact certain desired reforms.143 By 
contrast, the VA’s and FTC’s actions arguably represent more 
substantial incursions onto states’ sovereignty. Yet none of these 
measures attempts to coopt or preempt state’ authority over licensing 
altogether. The section below describes each of these measures in more 
detail, how they might improve access to health care, and the scope for 
future efforts to build on this progress. Although the steps taken to 
date have been somewhat ad hoc and limited, they can form the basis 
for a coherent and effective general approach to a less costly and more 
effective licensing system. 
 
142. Amelia Goodfellow et al., Predictors of Primary Care Physician Practice 
Location in Underserved Urban or Rural Areas in the United States: A 
Systematic Literature Review, 91 ACAD. MED. 1313 (2016). This seems at 
least in part attributable to the J1 visa-waiver program, which allows 
foreign physicians to become eligible for green cards if they work for three 
years in an area designated by HRSA as “Health Professional Shortage 
Areas.” See Talia R. Kahn, et al., Retention of J-1 Visa Waiver Program 
Physicians in Washington State’s Health Professional Shortage Areas, 85 
ACAD. MED. 614, 614-615 (2010). 
143. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 584 (referring to 
Medicaid and SCHIP as “classic cooperative federalism programs”); 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-
Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 122-
123 (2010) (“Conditional spending programs, such as Medicaid, are prime 
examples of cooperative federalism.”). 
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A. Federal Licensing Changes 
Although health care providers are licensed by the states, the 
federal government exerts some limited authority over licenses for 
providers who work as employees for federal government agencies such 
as the VA. It has a history of using this authority to relax licensing 
restrictions to improve access to health care for military and veteran 
populations. For example, military health care providers (including 
doctors, nurses, dentists, psychologists) who have a license can work in 
a military hospital without obtaining a license in the state in which the 
specific facility they are working at is located.144 Other federal programs, 
such as the Veterans Administration, the Indian Health Service, and 
the Public Health Service have similar programs.145 
In recent years, the federal government has increasingly used this 
power to ease licensing restrictions with the aim of improving provider 
mobility and increasing telehealth utilization. In 2011, Congress passed 
the Servicemembers’ Telemedicine & E-Health Portability (STEP) Act, 
which expanded the existing state licensure exemption for health care 
professionals treating Department of Defense (DOD) patients to 
“include qualified DOD civilians and personal service contractors” and 
to remove the requirement that care for service members be delivered 
in a military facility.146 A 2016 memorandum from the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the Department of Defense 
further enlarged this exemption by applying it to health care providers 
in TRICARE (the civilian health care program for service members and 
their dependents)147 and clarifying that telemedicine services could be 
delivered at the patient’s home.148 In 2018, the VA promulgated a rule 
 
144. See Sulentic, supra note 122, at 36 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1094(d)-(e)(1)). 
145. Id.; see, e.g., VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., VHA HANDBOOK 1100.19 (2012), 
at 14 (“Applicants being credentialed in preparation for applying for 
clinical privileges must possess at least one full, active, current, and 
unrestricted license that authorizes the licensee to practice in the state of 
licensure and outside VA without any change being needed in the status 
of the license.”). 
146. One Page Summary on the H.R. 1832, the STEP Act, U.S. CONGRESSMAN 
GLENN ‘GT’ THOMPSON, https://thompson.house.gov/sites/thompson. 
house.gov/files/One%20Page%20Summary%20on%20the%20STEP%20A
ct.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2019). 
147. About Us, TRICARE, https://www.tricare.mil/About (last visited Nov. 25, 
2018). 
148. Ellen L. Janos & Carrie Roll, U.S. Department of Defense Expands 
Telemedicine Access for Military Members, MINTZ (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2016-03-us-
department-defense-expands-telemedicine-access-military. 
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allowing VA health care providers to deliver care through telehealth 
regardless of where the provider or patient is located.149 
The VA has also used its regulatory authority to relax scope-of-
practice restrictions for APNs in VA facilities. In 2016, the VA finalized 
regulations granting “full practice authority” for three categories of 
APNs—Nurse Practitioners, Clinical Nurse Specialists, and Certified 
Nurse-Midwives.150 This rule expanded the scope of the services that 
these professionals can offer, for example, clarifying that Certified NPs 
have the authority to take patient histories, provide physical exams, 
order laboratory images, and prescribe medications.151 The rule also 
expressly preempts conflicting state laws that circumscribe APNs’ scope 
of practice when they are working at the VA.152 The goal of the 
regulation is to “[increase] veterans’ access to VA health care by 
expanding the pool of qualified health care professionals who are 
authorized to provide primary health care and other related health care 
services to the full extent of their education, training, and certification, 
without the clinical supervision of physicians.”153 
Although no empirical research has yet assessed the impacts of 
these measures, they have the potential to improve access to care for 
service members, veterans, and their dependents.154 These regulatory 
changes affect a sizable number of people: the VA alone serves over six 
million patients each year and is the nation’s largest employer of 
nurses.155 
These recent measures loosely fit what Abbe Gluck calls “field-
claiming federalism,” which “denotes a set of small moves that 
 
149. Authority of Health Care Providers to Practice Telehealth, 83 Fed. Reg. 
21897 (May 11, 2018) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
150. Nursing Services, 38 C.F.R. § 17.415 (2016). 
151. Id. The proposed rule would have also encompassed a fourth category of 
APNs, certified registered nurse anesthetists, but the VA revised its 
proposal to leave them out after the proposed rule was met with intense 
opposition from anesthesiologists. Virgil Dickson, VA Finalizes Rule that 
Expands Scope of Nurse Practice, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161213/NEWS/161219974. 
152. 38 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2016). 
153. Id. 
154. Charlie Reed, Telehealth Offers Hopes for Better Access to Specialists, 
Lower Costs, STARS & STRIPES, (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://www.stripes.com/news/telehealth-offers-hopes-for-better-access-
to-specialists-lower-costs-1.212850#.WV_Ay02Wy71. 
155. VA Grants Full Practice Authority to Advance Practice Registered 
Nurses, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 14, 2016, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2847; Veterans 
Health Administration: About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
https://www.va.gov/health/aboutVHA.asp (last updated Dec. 27, 2018). 
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announce the federal government’s entry into an area of traditional 
state authority.”156 The fit is not perfect: instead of announcing the 
federal government’s entry into health licensing, these policies have 
incrementally expanded existing federal authority over health licensing 
requirements.157 Yet these policies may still have “boundary-shifting” 
significance. Both the VA rules and the STEP Act are limited measures 
and mostly preserve states’ control over licensing, but may “pave[] the 
way for further and more extensive [federal] regulation.”158 Indeed, some 
supporters of these measures have even hailed them as a potential first 
step for Congress on the path toward enacting national telemedicine 
legislation that applies to all health care providers.159 
B. Fiscal Support 
Congress has taken a series of small steps to provide fiscal support 
to incentivize states to reform their licensing regimes to improve access 
to care. In 2002, Congress passed a law which authorized the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to award grants to 
state licensing boards to encourage cooperation and reduce barriers to 
telemedicine.160 The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) created additional funding for the purpose of making licenses 
more portable across state lines.161 The 2010 ACA established the 
National Health Care Workforce Commission and authorized a series of 
grants to states to address health care workforce issues, with a 
particular focus on licensure portability,162 though Congress never 
appropriated the money requested by the Obama Administration to 
fund the commission.163 
HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program has contributed to 
an important and under-appreciated development: the formation of a 
 
156. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 587. 
157. In addition, unlike the measures on which Gluck focuses, these ones do 
not give states the option of opting out of these provisions. See id. at 573. 
158. Id. at 587. 
159. See Meredith Lawrence, DoD STEP Act – A Model for Public 
Healthcare?, WORK SPACE TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013, 1:04 PM), 
http://theworkspacetoday.com/2013/08/01/dod-step-act-a-model-for-
public-healthcare/. 
160. Health Care Safety Net Amendments of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-251, § 102 
(2002); WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 2. 
161. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 17. 
162. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 5101, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 2. 
163. Peter I. Buerhaus & Sheldon M. Retchin, The Dormant National Health 
Care Workforce Commission Needs Congressional Funding to Fulfill its 
Promise, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2021, 2022 (2013). 
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number of “interstate compacts” for health care professionals. These 
interstate compacts are regulatory agreements among states and 
professional organizations aimed at making it easier for providers to 
relocate from one state to another and to ease the barriers to 
telehealth.164 
The first such compact was the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC), 
developed by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) 
in the 1990s and implemented in 2000.165 The NLC permits certain types 
of nurses in participating states to practice across state lines, either 
electronically or in person, without obtaining a new license.166 It uses a 
system of “mutual recognition,” in which a nurse located in a state that 
has adopted the NLC may acquire a single multi-state license that 
allows him or her to practice in any other state that has adopted the 
NLC.167 Of note, the NLC does not obviate all licensing barriers to 
interstate practice. For instance, nurses must still comply with the 
scope-of-practice regime in the state in which they are practicing.168 
Although the compact was developed before the establishment of 
HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program, the NCSBN later 
received funding from the program to “[pursue] a range of activities to 
overcome the barriers to adopting the NLC.”169 Currently 25 states 
participate in the NLC,170 and in 2015, the NCSBN developed a similar 
compact for APNs, who were not included in the original agreement.171 
 
164. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 9, 48. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of 
Permanency, 49 FLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (evaluating the democratic 
implications of interstate compacts); Matthew Pincus, When Should 
Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 511, 513-14 (2009) (examining current doctrine concerning 
when interstate compacts require Congressional consent and proposing a 
new jurisprudential standard). 
165. Sandra Evans, The Nurse Licensure Compact: A Historical 
Perspective, J. NURS. REG., Oct. 2015, at 11. 
166. NLC FAQs, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. BOARDS NURSING, 
https://www.ncsbn.org/94.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
167. Nurse Licensure Compact: What Nurse Employers Need to Knows, NAT’L 
COUNCIL ST. BOARDS NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/ 
NLCA_Employers_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2019). 
168. Nurse Licensure Compact FAQ, N.H. BOARD NURSING, 
https://www.oplc.nh.gov/nursing/faq-nurse-compact.htm#scope (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
169. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 16. 
170. Updated Map: Enhanced Nursing Licensure Compact (eNLC) May. 2018, 
NURSE (May 23, 2018), https://nurse.org/articles/enhanced-compact-
multi-state-license-eNLC/. 
171. APRN Compact, NAT’L COUNCIL STATE BOARDS NURSING, 
https://www.ncsbn.org/aprn-compact.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
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HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program also supported the 
development of a similar interstate compact for physicians, the 
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact (IMLC).172 The IMLC was 
developed by the Federation of State Medical Boards—an umbrella 
organization representing the various state medical and osteopathic 
licensing boards—and has been adopted in 25 states as of January 
2019.173 Unlike the NLC, the IMLC still requires physicians in 
participating states to acquire a separate license for each state in which 
they practice, but it aims to make it easier for them to do so.174 
In addition to nurses and physicians, a number of other health care 
professions have begun to form similar arrangements. Separate 
compacts are being developed for social workers, physical and 
occupational therapists, emergency medical services, psychologists, 
mental health counselors, pharmacists, and dentists.175 While it remains 
to be seen how effectively these compacts will ease the adoption of 
telehealth services and improve interstate mobility, they represent one 
potential means of improving access to health care.176 
So far, the amount of federal funding provided to the states for 
licensing reform has been fairly minimal and narrowly targeted, and 
some scholars have urged the federal government to adopt a more 
 
172. Federal Grant Awarded to Support State Medical Boards in Developing 
Infrastructure for Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, FED’N STATE 
MED. BOARDS (July 17, 2015), http://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/ 
advocacy/news-releases/2015/compact-commission-grant.pdf. 
173. Michigan Joins Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, FED’N STATE MED. 
BOARDS (Jan. 8, 2019), http://www.fsmb.org/advocacy/news-
releases/michigan-joins-interstate-medical-licensure-compact/. 
174. Humayun J. Chaudhry et al., Improving Access and Mobility – The 
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, 372 NEW ENG. J MED. 1581 (2015). 
175. National Center for Interstate Compacts, COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS, 
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Michael Ollove, 
Make Doctor’s Licenses Like Driver’s Licenses? Medical Groups Say No, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org 
/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/12/11/make-doctors-
licenses-like-drivers-licenses-medical-groups-say-no. 
176. Christina DePasquale & Kevin Stange, Labor Supply Effects of 
Occupational Regulation: Evidence from the Nurse Licensure Compact 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22344, 2016) 
(finding that the adoption of the Nurse Licensure Compact did not 
have any significant impacts on mobility); Anna Louie Sussman, 
Occupational Licensing Doesn’t Seem to Restrict Nurses’ Mobility, WALL 
ST. J. (July 22, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/ 
07/22/occupational-licensing-doesnt-seem-to-restrict-nurses-mobility/ 
(“Morris Kleiner, a University of Minnesota economist who has studied 
licensing extensively, offered a complementary explanation: Nurses’ 
interstate migration is less affected by licensing than other licensed 
professionals”). 
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ambitious program. Economist Morris Kleiner has proposed a 
competition modeled on the Department of Education’s “Race to the 
Top” program.177 Others have proposed that the federal government 
utilize Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement as levers to influence 
states’ licensing schemes.178 
These fiscal incentives largely fit into the classic mode of 
“cooperative federalism,” in which the federal government provides the 
states with fiscal support on the condition that they enact certain 
federal policy goals.179 Yet such measures can be more or less 
prescriptive, depending on how they are designed.180 To the extent that 
the government adopts a more prescriptive approach, it would have to 
be careful not to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s holding in NFIB v. 
Sebelius that sufficiently coercive federal financial incentives can violate 
the Constitution.181 
C. Antitrust Remedies 
Another way that the federal government has influence over state 
licensing laws is through antitrust enforcement. Although the FTC has 
long criticized states’ occupational licensing laws as harmful and 
anticompetitive,182 until recently its power to challenge these laws has 
been hamstrung as state licensing boards have generally been assumed 
to be immune from federal antitrust scrutiny.183 This changed in 2015 
 
177. Kleiner et al., A Proposal, supra note 14, at 18-19. 
178. See, e.g., Safriet Impediments, supra note 96, at 316; Barbara J. Safriet, 
Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice 
Nursing, 9 YALE J. REG. 417, 481-482 (1992) [hereinafter Safriet, Health 
Care Dollars]. 
179. Leonard, supra note 143, at 122-123 (“Conditional spending programs, 
such as Medicaid, are prime examples of cooperative federalism.”). 
180. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National 
Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 885 
(2009); SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 244. 
181. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012). 
182. See, e.g., COX & FOSTER, supra note 46; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T 
JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004). 
183. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1099 (“Despite wide recognition of the 
potential for economic harm associated with allowing professions to 
control their licensing rules and define the scope of their art, real reform 
is elusive. Part of the reason is that, in the professional licensing context, 
the most powerful legal tool against anticompetitive activity appears 
unavailable. Most jurisdictions interpret antitrust federalism to shield 
licensing boards from the Sherman Act despite the fact that the boards 
often look and act like § 1’s principal target.”); Sanderson, supra note 69, 
at 469 (Although “the FTC has repeatedly taken on occupational licensing 
schemes . . . its successes have been minor and marginal; on the core issue 
of whether the Sherman Act or Federal Trade Commission Act can be 
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when the Supreme Court held in North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC (hereafter North Carolina Dental Examiners) that 
state licensing boards are not automatically immune from federal 
antitrust scrutiny.184 
The dispute underlying North Carolina Dental Examiners began 
simmering in the early 2000s, when non-dentist providers began offering 
teeth-whitening services in North Carolina and charging lower prices 
than dentists had been charging.185 The North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners, a state licensing board composed primarily of 
dentists, became aware of this trend, and issued a number of cease-and-
desist letters to the non-dentist providers, charging that teeth-
whitening constituted the “practice of dentistry.”186 The Board’s actions 
were successful, and the non-dentists ceased offering teeth-whitening in 
the state.187 Thereafter, the FTC filed an administrative complaint 
against the Board, charging that its actions constituted anti-
competitive conduct in violation the Federal Trade Commission Act.188 
In response, the Board claimed that because it was a state agency, it 
was immune from antitrust law under the “state action” doctrine.189 
The legal issue in North Carolina Dental Examiners concerned 
whether state licensing boards enjoy antitrust immunity under the state 
action doctrine. First established by the Supreme Court in 1943 in 
Parker v. Brown, the idea undergirding the state action doctrine is 
“that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, could not have intended 
to prohibit all state economic regulation that displaces competition.”190 
In the decades that followed Parker v. Brown, lower courts had 
difficulty determining the parameters of this holding.191 Because states 
frequently govern by delegating regulatory authority to private 
citizens,192 the Court later provided in California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., that private entities enjoy state-action 
immunity if they meet two conditions: (1) if their conduct is “clearly 
 
used against state protectionism, the FTC’s defeat has been almost 
total.”). 
184. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015). 
185. Id. at 1108. 
186. Id. at 1107-08. 
187. Id. at 1108. 
188. Id. at 1108-09. 
189. Id. at 1109. 
190. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); Sherman Act--State-Action 
Immunity--North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 129 
Harv. L. Rev. 371 (2015). 
191. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1119-1120. 
192. Id. 
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articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;” and (2) is 
“‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”193 The Supreme Court 
subsequently held that some government entities—including 
municipalities—only needed to meet the first standard to enjoy 
antitrust immunity, because there is a presumption that they operate 
in the public interest.194 
Until recently, most courts and commentators assumed that state 
agencies, including licensing boards, were included in this category of 
government entities and thus that they were essentially immune from 
antitrust scrutiny.195 However, the Supreme Court had not directly 
addressed whether state agencies, including professional licensing 
boards, were subject to the second, “active supervision” requirement.196 
In its 2015 ruling, the Supreme Court held that “a state board on 
which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market 
participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s 
active supervision requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust 
immunity.”197 The Court reasoned that because the dental board was 
controlled by dentists and there was no evidence of “active supervision” 
from the state, it was effectively a private actor and not immune from 
antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine.198 
In the wake of North Carolina Dental Examiners, a number of 
states have enacted new oversight standards in an attempt to satisfy 
the “active supervision” requirement and immunize their boards against 
antitrust scrutiny. States have taken different approaches: for example, 
Governor Bentley of Alabama issued an executive order requiring an 
executive branch agency or official to oversee state licensing boards;199 
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued an order requiring its attorney 
 
193. California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et 
al., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). 
194. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (“We may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public 
interest.”). 
195. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1121-1125; see Neil Katsuyama, The 
Economics of Occupational Licensing: Applying Antitrust Economics to 
Distinguish Between Beneficial and Anticompetitive Professional 
Licenses, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 565, 569 (2010); Einer Richard 
Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 693 
(1991); Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants of 
Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1988). 
196. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1124. 
197. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015). 
198. Id. at 1116. 
199. Ala. Exec. Order No. 7 (2015), https://nasba.org/app/uploads/2018/ 
05/872.pdf. 
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general’s office to oversee state licensing boards;200 the Arkansas 
Legislature passed a bill entrusting oversight of its licensing rules to a 
legislative subcommittee;201 and the Georgia Legislature gave its 
governor the direct authority to veto or modify its licensing boards’ 
decision.202 
In theory, states could also try to insulate their licensing boards 
from antitrust scrutiny, either “by creating regulatory boards that serve 
only in an advisory capacity, or by staffing a regulatory board 
exclusively with persons who have no financial interest in the 
occupation that is being regulated.”203 Yet, at least so far, states appear 
to be more focused on satisfying the active supervision requirement.204 
Professor Rebecca Haw Allensworth has characterized this new state of 
affairs as “the new antitrust federalism,” in which antitrust immunity 
is conditioned “not on the fact of state regulation but on the process of 
regulation.”205 
The reverberations of North Carolina Dental Examiners are still 
being felt, and the extent to which such institutional changes will affect 
substantive licensing standards is still unclear. Many observers have 
expressed skepticism that the bar established by the Court will in 
practice constrain licensing boards from engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct or substantively alter states’ licensing regimes.206 That being 
 
200. Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-33 (2015). Retrieved from www.sos.ok.gov 
/documents/executive/993.pdf. 
201. ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-3-309 (2016).  
202. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3(a) (2016). 
203. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF 
STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
(2015). See also Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1601 (arguing that “altering 
professional dominance on boards may be an attractive alternative to 
supervision . . . ”). 
204. Suzanne Weiss, States are Re-Examining the Way They Regulate a 
Variety of Occupations, ST. LEGIS. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/licensed-to- 
labor636179334.aspx. See also Nicole Livanos, State Board Shake-Up: 
Legislative Action in the Wake of North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 J. NUR. REG. 60 (2016). 
205. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 1387, 1387 (2016). 
206. Herbert Hovenkamp, Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism and 
the North Carolina Dental Case, 4 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1, 16 
(2015) (“The standard that the Supreme Court has developed is actually 
not all that high. The final decision must come from a government 
decision-maker with power to review and disapprove, but largely under 
any standard that the state wishes to articulate. What the state cannot 
do, however, is simply paste the label ‘sovereign’ or ‘agency’ on a purely 
private actor.”); David Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions Are Just 
“Cartels by Another Name,” What Should We Do About It?, 163 U. PA. 
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said, the Court’s decision has clearly increased licensing boards’ liability 
and subjected them to greater scrutiny: so far, it has triggered dozens 
of lawsuits from current or prospective licensees, most of which have 
been settled or dismissed.207 
The FTC is also intensifying its efforts to challenge boards’ anti-
competitive conduct.208 For example, in 2016 the FTC and the 
Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief in favor of a 
telemedicine company’s challenge to a series of regulations adopted by 
the Texas Medical Board restricting telehealth services in that state.209 
In addition to litigation, the FTC has also stepped up its advocacy 
efforts directed at state legislatures, particularly with regard to scope 
of practice for APNs.210 Between January 2010 and November 2015, the 
 
L. REV. ONLINE 101, 112 (2015) (“Although active supervision may 
restrain some state licensing boards from engaging in some 
anticompetitive conduct, we are skeptical that it will actually do all that 
much to address the problems cataloged by Professors Edlin and Haw.”); 
Joseph Sanderson, North Carolina Board: Much Ado About Nothing, 
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/north-carolina-board-much-ado-about-nothing-
by-joseph-m-sanderson-2/ (“[W]hile North Carolina Board may have 
some effects on the margins, the broad landscape is largely unchanged.”); 
Schleicher, supra note 21, at 122 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s 
decision as “a minor move against occupational licenses.”). For a more 
optimistic view, see William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust as 
Disruptive Innovation in Health Care: Can Limiting State Action 
Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723 (2017) 
(arguing that the decision has the potential to be a “disruptive 
innovation” that will make health care markets more efficient). 
207. Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1582 (describing these lawsuits and arguing 
that “[t]hese suits not only expose states to significant financial liability, 
but they threaten to unravel the way that the occupations have been 
regulated for decades.”); Weiss, supra note 204. 
208. Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal 
Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 
26 HEALTH MATRIX 123, 162 (2016) (“[W]ith the Court validating that 
state licensing boards cannot automatically rely on state action immunity, 
the future portends a more aggressive FTC going after more state boards 
for anti-competitive regulations in the medical licensing and scope of 
practice arena.”). 
209. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellee, Teladoc Inc. et. al. v. Texas 
Medical Board, et. al., No. 16-50017 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2016). 
210. Maureen Ohlhausen, Beyond Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Role in 
Promoting Health Care Competition and Innovation, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/26/beyond-
law-enforcement-the-ftcs-role-in-promoting-health-care-competition-and-
innovation/; Khan, supra note 208, at 152 (“The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has become increasingly involved in advocating for 
less restrictive scope of practice laws. In the wake of the Institute of 
Medicine’s report on nursing and given expanded insurance coverage 
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FTC filed fifteen advocacy comments with state legislatures on scope 
of practice issues, and published a report on scope of practice issues for 
APNs.211 In 2017, it also formed a new “Economic Liberty Task Force,” 
which has focused in large part on occupational licensing.212 
D. The Affordable Care Act 
Although the ACA explicitly preserves state authority in certain 
areas, including occupational licensing, 213 it indirectly created 
substantial pressure for states, licensing boards, and professional 
associations to reshape occupational regulations. It did so in two main 
ways. First, by dramatically expanding the number of Americans who 
have health insurance, the ACA accentuated concerns that there would 
be a shortage in the supply of physicians—and in particular, primary 
care physicians—in the United States to provide care for the newly 
insured, who tend to use health care services at a higher rate than the 
uninsured.214 In response, many scholars and policymakers proposed 
 
under the ACA’s individual mandate, many states that still require 
collaboration agreements are revisiting the practice”). 
211. Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa Koslov, A Flexible Health Care Workforce 
Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment: Promoting Health Care 
Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 147, 183 
(2016). 
212. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Launches New Website 
Dedicated to Economic Liberty (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-launches-new-website-dedicated-
economic-liberty. But see Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 15 (arguing 
that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission should 
not prioritize policing occupational regulations, and that current antitrust 
framework’s emphasis on efficiency is ill-suited to evaluating occupational 
licensing regimes). 
213. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2018); Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 
28, at 582 (“We see that philosophy in . . . areas in which Congress chose 
not to regulate at all, leaving matters such as doctor licensing to the 
exclusive and historical province of state regulation.”). 
214. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 57, 63 (2015) (“Policymakers’ greatest immediate concern is a 
coming ‘doc shortage,’ especially a shortage of primary-care physicians, 
who were in short supply even before the ACA’s enactment.”); Annie 
Lowrey & Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1; Michael Ollove, Are There Enough 
Doctors For The Newly Insured?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 3, 2014), 
https://khn.org/news/doctor-shortage-primary-care-specialist/; 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Health Care Waiting Game: Long Waits for 
Doctors’ Appointments Have Become the Norm, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/sunday-review/long-waits-
for-doctors-appointments-have-become-the-norm.html. 
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expanding scope-of-practice restrictions for APNs in order to meet this 
rising demand.215 
Second, the ACA contained a number of “delivery system” reforms 
aimed at making the delivery of health care more efficient. These 
included increased support for certain care delivery models, such as 
Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and nurse-managed health 
clinics (NMHCs), which allow NPs to play larger roles in care 
delivery.216 This emphasis on expanding roles for non-physician 
practitioners has in turn placed additional scrutiny on licensing boards’ 
efforts to restrict practitioners’ scopes of practice.217 
These reforms have coincided with—and likely contributed to—
tangible changes in states’ licensing regimes.218 Since the beginning of 
 
215. Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Mark D. Smith, Primary Care: Proposed 
Solutions to The Physician Shortage Without Training More Physicians, 
32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1881, 1884 (2013); Linda V. Green et al., Primary 
Care Physician Shortages Could Be Eliminated Through Use of Teams, 
Nonphysicians, and Electronic Communication, 32 HEALTH AFF. 11, 16 
(2013); Peter D. Jacobson & Shelley A. Jazowski, Physicians, the 
Affordable Care Act, and Primary Care: Disruptive Change or Business 
as Usual?, 26(8) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 934, 934-35 (2011) (“Historically, 
the United States has fluctuated between projected physician shortfalls 
and surpluses. With the passage of the ACA, the nation will face a 
physician shortage in the coming decades . . . expanding the role of NPPs 
as primary care practitioners is probably the most immediate strategy for 
alleviating the primary care shortage”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, James 
Madison Professor of Econ. and Pub. Affairs, Transcript of statement 
before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Lab., Educ. & Pensions entitled 
‘30 Million New Patients and 11 Months to Go: Who Will Provide Their 
Primary Care?, 113th Cong. 3 (2013), available at 
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reinhardt.pdf. 
216. See J. Margo Brooks Carthon et al., Federal Policies Influence Access to 
Primary Care and Nurse Practitioner Workforce, 11(5) J. NURSE PRAC. 
527, 528 (2015). See also Richard S. Saver, Health Law’s Uneasy 
Relationship with Delivery System Innovation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK U.S. 
HEALTH L. 659, 665-666 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William 
M. Sage eds., 1st ed., Oxford University Press 2017) (“The Affordable 
Care Act’s initiatives to increase the number of nurses in clinical practice 
generally and demonstration grants for nurse practitioner training 
programs favor delivery models like retail clinics that depend heavily on 
nurse practitioner staffing.”). 
217. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 4 (“The Affordable Care Act fosters 
expanded roles for continuity of care, accessible preventive care, and 
management of chronic illness at a lower cost. The activities of the 
licensure boards in restricting the work of these professionals are coming 
under increased scrutiny.”). 
218. See Gabriel Scheffler, The Dynamism of Health Law: Expanded Insurance 
Coverage as the Engine of Regulatory Reform 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020); Johnson, supra note 41, at 504 (“The great concern 
over the shortage of primary care physicians to meet these goals is . . . 
fostering a push to expand practice opportunities for [APNs and PAs].”); 
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2010, the year the ACA was signed into law, ten states have expanded 
their scope-of-practice regimes for NPs to “Full Practice,” bringing the 
total number to 22 states and DC (as of June 2017).219 Although there 
were likely many different factors that contributed to these changes, 
advocates and policymakers who pushed for the reforms in these states 
have cited concerns about not having enough health care providers to 
meet the rising demand for health care brought about by the ACA.220 
For example, the National Governors Association issued a policy paper 
proposing that states reexamine their scope of practice laws for NPs, in 
part to meet the rising demand for health care due to the ACA.221 
Advocates of interstate compacts also cited concerns about the ACA’s 
insurance expansion leading to a shortage of health care providers.222 
Although the connection between the ACA and occupational 
licensing may seem attenuated, this is not the first time that expanding 
 
STUART H. ALTMAN ET AL., ASSESSING PROGRESS ON THE INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE REPORT THE FUTURE OF NURSING 5 (2016). 
219. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC., supra note 101. 
220. See, e.g., Catherine Dower et al., It is Time to Restructure Health 
Professions Scope-of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care, 
32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1971, 1971 (2013) (“With the ACA’s expansion of 
access to health care services, there is increasing interest in scope of 
practice—that is, what services may be provided by which health 
professions under what conditions. Scope-of-practice laws limit the bounds 
of professional practice for many providers. According to the Scope of 
Practice Legislation Tracking Database, established by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, nearly 1,800 practice act–related bills 
were proposed in the United States between January 2011 and December 
2012; of these, almost 350, or 20 percent, were adopted.”); Lydia DePillis, 
In a Fight Between Nurses and Doctors, the Nurses are Slowly Winning, 
WASH. POST. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2016/03/18/in-a-fight-between-nurses-and-doctors-the-nurses-
are-slowly-winning/ (“For Beth Baldwin, president of the West Virginia 
Nurses Association, the measure was aimed at meeting the needs of people 
who live in rural areas where the nearest physicians might be miles away 
— especially as the Affordable Care Act has expanded the pool of those 
with access to insurance.”); Christine Vestal, Nurse Practitioners Slowly 
Gain Autonomy, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 19, 2013), 
http://khn.org/news/stateline-nurse- practitioners-scope-of-practice/ 
(“The need for the law, advocates say, was urgent, particularly 
because Sandoval welcomed the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid 
expansion in his state, one of only six Republican governors to do so”). 
221. The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Meeting Increasing Demand for 
Primary Care, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Dec. 20, 2012), 
https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1212NursePractitione
rsPaper.pdf. 
222. See, e.g., Chaudhry et al., supra note 174, at 1581-1582; Nurse Licensure 
Compact, NAT’L COUNCIL STATE BOARDS OF NURSING (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.ncsbn.org/2016NLC_JPuente.pdf. 
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access to health care services has coincided with policymakers 
liberalizing regulatory barriers for health care providers. For example, 
the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 led to similar concerns 
about a shortage of primary care physicians, which in turn contributed 
to the development of the first nurse practitioner programs.223 
Further increasing the demand for health care and changing how 
care is delivered could add to the pressure to liberalize licensing 
requirements. Professor Barbara Safriet has argued that one way to 
place pressure on state licensing boards is to amend Medicaid and 
Medicare to ensure that APNs are eligible for reimbursement for 
services that they are equipped to provide, even if those services fall 
outside states’ scope-of-practice laws.224 Professor Fazal Khan predicts 
that developments in mobile health care will “dramatically tilt the 
balance of power” in legislative battles over licensing, in the same way 
that Uber resulted in relaxed municipal licensing barriers for taxi 
services, and notes that so far “the federal government seems to have 
gone out of its way to promote this industry.”225 
 
*   *   * 
 
Although this paper focuses on the federal government’s licensing 
reform efforts with respect to health care providers, the federal 
government has recently taken a few steps that apply to non-health 
care fields as well. For instance, it has used its limited power over 
federal licenses to limit barriers for people with criminal records: in 
2016, the Obama Administration issued an executive order to federal 
agencies to limit federal licensing restrictions that apply to people with 
criminal records, as part of a broader suite of actions designed to help 
 
223. See, e.g., John Michael O’Brien, How Nurse Practitioners Obtained 
Provider Status: Lessons for Pharmacists, 60 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. 
PHARMACY 2301 (2003); Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at 
431-432. 
224. Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at 481. 
225. Khan, supra note 208, at 125, 162. See also FURROW ET AL., supra note 
43, at 4 (“Three major factors are having a growing impact on the 
structure and practice of professional licensure. These are the expansion 
and accessibility of information concerning quality and outcomes of health 
care; a significant shift in approach to defining the standard of care; and 
public policy and payment supports for expanded roles for non-physician 
health care professionals.”); Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health 
Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1200 (2014) (arguing that 
“contrary to prevailing sentiment, Congress and federal regulators are 
facilitating rather than stifling mobile health technologies”). See 
generally Matthew Wansley, Virtuous Capture, 67 ADMIN L. REV. 419, 
422 (2015) (contending that “[i]n some cases, political actors can and 
should use interest groups—by altering their power and incentives—
to pursue public interested regulatory goals”). 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Unlocking Access to Health Care:  A Federalist Approach to Reforming 
Occupational Licensing 
336 
incorporate ex-offenders into society.226 It has directed additional federal 
funding to states: in 2017, the U.S. Labor Department awarded 7.5 
million dollars to the National Conference of State Legislatures lead a 
coalition of 10 states to reduce barriers to labor market entry and 
“[i]mprove portability for selected occupational licenses across state 
lines.”227 Finally, although the FTC has been especially involved in 
health licensing issues, 228 it has taken actions in other fields as well, 
including submitting public comments on state legislation and litigation 
that would affect licensing for attorneys, interior designers, and casket 
salesmen.229 In addition, it is at least possible to imagine comparable 
federal reforms in non-health care fields (such as expanding legal 
insurance) that would increase demand for a service or change how it 
is delivered, which in turn would increase pressure on licensing regimes 
in these fields. 
IV. The Inadequacy of Alternative Approaches 
Over the years, scholars and policymakers have advanced a variety 
of alternative proposals to reform state licensing for health care 
providers. These proposals vary both in the substance of their 
recommendations and the level of government at which they are aimed. 
Some reform proposals are addressed primarily to state policymakers, 
while others are addressed to the federal government, and call for it to 
 
226. Presidential Memorandum -- Promoting Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, Press Release, 
OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Apr. 29, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential-memorandum-
promoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration; Fact Sheet: President 
Obama Announces New Actions to Reduce Recidivism and Promote 
Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, OFF. PRESS 
SECRETARY (June 24, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/ 
the-press- office/2016/06/24/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new- 
actions-reduce-recidivism-and. 
227. US Labor Department Awards $7.5M to Fund Research for Improving 
Geographic Mobility For Workers In Licensed Occupations, U.S. 
DEP’T LAB., (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases 
/eta/eta20170112-0; Notice of Intent to Fund Project on Occupational 
Licensing Review and Portability: NOI-ETA-16-14, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.doleta.gov/grants/pdf/NOI-ETA-16-14.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2019). 
228. See, e.g., Ohlhausen, supra note 210, (“Not surprisingly, a significant 
portion of the FTC’s competition advocacy work is focused on the 
health care sector.”). 
229. Selected Advocacy Relating to Occupational Licensing, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty/ 
selected- advocacy-relating-occupational-licensing (last visited Sept. 
26, 2017). 
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preempt state licensing laws. For the most part, however, such 
proposals largely ignore—or devote only cursory attention to—how the 
solutions they propose will overcome the same political dynamics which 
at least some of them acknowledge as being responsible for the 
deficiencies in our current system.230 
This section outlines some of these proposals and explores why a 
federalist approach is more likely to succeed. It concludes that states 
are unlikely to implement major reforms to their own licensing regimes 
without any federal intervention, due to lack of incentives to 
experiment, the presence of externalities, and collective action 
problems. It also concludes that a federalist approach is more feasible 
than outright federal preemption, given interest group opposition and 
Congressional norms, and that a federalist approach has important 
functional advantages as well. 
A. Alternative Reform Proposals 
1. State Reform Proposals 
Over the years, there have been numerous calls for states to reform 
their health licensing regimes. For instance, in 1995, the Pew Health 
Professions Commission released 10 recommendations for states to 
reform their licensing requirements for health care providers, such as 
standardizing entry-to-practice requirements, allowing “all professionals 
to provide services to the full extent of their current knowledge, 
training, experience and skills,” and “redesign[ing] health professional 
boards and their functions to reflect the interdisciplinary and public 
accountability demands of the changing health care delivery system.”231 
In 2011, the Institute of Medicine published a report on the future of 
nursing, which included a recommendation that states reform their 
scope-of-practice regulations for APNs to enable them “to practice to 
the full extent of their education and training.”232 
The federal government has issued its own recommendations. In 
2004, the FTC published a report on improving competition in health 
care, which included a recommendation that states “broaden the 
membership of state licensure boards” and “consider implementing 
uniform licensing standards or reciprocity compacts to reduce barriers 
to telemedicine and competition from out-of-state providers who wish 
 
230. See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1745 (describing 
such shifting between perspectives as the “inside/outside fallacy,” 
when “the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint of an 
analyst . . . and the internal standpoint of an actor within the 
system”). 
231. FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at ix. 
232. INST. MED., supra note 110, at 9. 
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to move in-state.”233 The FTC released a report specifically focused on 
the regulation of APNs in 2014, which included a number of 
recommendations for state legislators.234 In 2015, the Obama White 
House issued a report on occupational licensing (including—but not 
limited to—licensing requirements for health care providers), which 
included a number of licensing “best practices” for states, including 
“[a]llowing practitioners to offer services to the full extent of their 
current competency, to ensure that all qualified workers are able to 
offer services.”235 
These recommendations likely contributed to reforms at the state 
level. For instance, the Institute of Medicine report created momentum 
for states to expand their scopes of practices for APNs.236 The Obama 
Administration cited several states that proposed reforms in line with 
its recommendations after the release of its report.237 
Yet despite the release of numerous different recommendations 
aimed at state policymakers over the years, many of the problems with 
our licensing system that were identified long ago still exist today. Some 
of the same critiques in the 2015 Obama White House Report (for 
instance, that the system of state licensing hinders provider mobility 
and that scope of practice restrictions are overly stringent) were 
articulated twenty years earlier in the 1995 Pew Health Professions 
Commission report,238 and those critiques in turn echo points made by 
Benjamin Shimberg in the 1970s and 80s.239 
2. Federal Reform Proposals 
Rather than calling on the states to reform their own licensing 
regimes, others have taken a different approach, proposing instead that 
the federal government preempt state health licensing regimes to make 
 
233. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 22-
25. 
234. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 108, at 1. 
235. WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. 
236. See DePillis, supra note 220 (noting that nurses’ arguments to expand 
their scope-of-practice were “bolstered by a seminal report from the 
National Academies of Science in 2010, which recommended that states 
remove barriers to nurses practicing ‘to the full extent of their education 
and training.’”). 
237. Press Release - Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation 
Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wage, THE 
WHITE HOUSE - OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, (June 17, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-
sheet-new-steps-reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting. 
238. FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at vi-vii. 
239. See SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 15. 
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our system more rational and uniform.240 Perhaps the most intuitive 
proposal along these lines is to replace our current patchwork of 
conflicting state licensing laws with a single system of federal licensure 
for health care providers.241 There are compelling reasons to support a 
system of federal licensure. Since education and training standards for 
health care providers are largely standardized in the United States, it 
is difficult to justify the discrepancies among state licensing regimes on 
grounds of quality.242 At the same time, differences among state 
requirements impede the adoption of telemedicine and make it more 
difficult for health care providers to relocate or practice in multiple 
states.243 Preempting state licensing laws and creating a single federal 
licensing regime could improve access to health care through both of 
these channels.244 Nevertheless, as far as I am aware, Congress has never 
seriously considered replacing state licenses for health care providers 
with a single federal licensing regime. 
A more targeted proposal is for the federal government to 
specifically preempt state licensing restrictions that prevent health care 
providers from delivering services across state lines remotely through 
telehealth. There are several ways that Congress could do this: it could 
create a special federal license for telehealth; it could preempt state 
restrictions on out-of-state providers delivering health care via 
telehealth; or it could pass legislation specifying that the location where 
a health care provider practices be considered to be where the provider 
is located, rather than where the patient is located.245 Any of these 
proposals would require preempting state law and would mean that 
health care providers providing health care services remotely through 
telemedicine would have to be licensed only in the state in which they 
reside, and not necessarily the states in which their patients are located. 
 
240. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 120, at 443. 
241. See, e.g., Gavil & Koslov, supra note 211, at 195-196; McLean, supra 
note 120, at 446; Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at 447. 
242. See Kocher et al., supra note 126. 
243. See supra Part II(b). 
244. See Zilis, supra note 87, at 213-14. 
245. For some proposals along these lines, see, for example, Jacobson & Selvin, 
supra note 117, at 436; Rashid Bashshur, Telemedicine and State-Based 
Licensure in the United States, Revisited, 14 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH 
310 (2008); Matak, supra note 120, at 233; Shirley Svorny, Svorny: 
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Won’t Help, CLARION LEDGER, 
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/columnists/2016/02/26/s
vorny-interstate-medical-licensure-compact-wont-help/80998064/ (last 
updated Feb. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Svorny, Interstate Compact]; Shirley 
Svorny, Telemedicine Runs Into Crony Doctoring, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 
2016, 6:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/telemedicine-runs-into-
crony-doctoring-1469226979. 
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This would remove one of the most important barriers to more 
widespread adoption of telehealth. 
There has been at least one attempt to preempt state licensing 
restrictions on telehealth. In 1995, then-representative Ron Wyden 
introduced—and later withdrew—an amendment to the bill that 
became the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which would have 
prohibited states from “directly or indirectly restrict[ing] interstate 
commerce by prohibiting any licensed physician from conducting a 
consultation with a licensed provider in another state using any 
advanced telecommunications service.”246 
Another option is for the federal government to preempt state 
scope-of-practice laws that prevent health care providers from 
practicing to the full extent of their competence and training. The 1993 
Clinton health care plan included a provision stating that “[n]o State 
may, through licensure or otherwise, restrict the practice of any class 
of health professionals beyond what is justified by the skills and training 
of such professionals.”247 This proposal presumably would have 
preempted at least those state scope-of-practice restrictions that were 
clearly unrelated to providers’ qualifications, such as site restrictions 
that allow nurses and other providers to provide services in one location 
but not in another. It also would have enabled plaintiffs to sue state 
licensing boards or administrative agencies in federal court if their scope 
of practice restrictions were not justified by substantive training 
criteria.248 
B. The Need for Federal Intervention 
One might reasonably argue that the states should be left to reform 
their own licensure regimes, and question whether the federal 
government needs to be involved in licensing at all. Licensing has 
traditionally been controlled by the states, and “the core of our federal 
system is the principle that the states should take the lead unless there 
is a need for federal action.”249 Moreover, two of the standard 
 
246. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., (1st Sess. 1995). The proposal originally referred 
to “licensed health care provider,” instead of “licensed physician.” U.S. 
DEPT. OF COM., 105TH CONG., TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS 
(1997), available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/reports/telemed/ 
cover.htm. 
247. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 1161 (1994). See also 
Ameringer, supra note 113, at 62. 
248. See H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 1161 (1994). 
249. Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 Yale L.J - 
F. 1, 2 (2017), available at www.yalelawjournal.com/forum/federalism-
and-the-end-of-obamacare; Collin Roth & Will Flanders, How 
Occupational Licensing Laws are Fencing People Out of Opportunity, 
FORBES (Apr. 27, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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justifications for federal preemption, correcting for discrimination 
against minority groups and compensating for states’ lack of fiscal 
capacity, do not appear to justify federal intervention in occupational 
licensing.250 
First, licensing does not reflect any obvious political pathologies, 
such as discrimination against minority groups. Although there are 
reasons to think that our licensing system disproportionately harms 
low-income individuals,251 the fact that a state policy is regressive has 
not traditionally been treated as a sufficient basis for federal 
intervention.252 Although scholars have historically argued that the 
occupational licensing disproportionately disadvantages minority 
groups,253 recent empirical scholarship finds that licensing might in fact 
have important benefits for historically disadvantaged groups, such as 
providing more accessible career pathways and helping to reduce 
statistical discrimination.254 
Nor can federal intervention be justified on the basis that states 
lack the fiscal capacity to enact licensing reform.255 Although some 
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Structural Effects of Occupational Licensure, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 600 
(2017). But see Benjamin Powell & Evgeny S. Vorotnikov, Was 
Occupational Licensing Good for Minorities? A Critique of Marc Law 
and Mindy Marks by Daniel B. Klein, 9 ECON. J. WATCH 210 (2012). 
255. See Bagley, supra note 249, at 10 (arguing that a national solution to 
health care reform was necessary in part because states lack the fiscal or 
taxing capacity to expand health insurance coverage on their own); see 
also Eric Lee & Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Positive Case for Centralization 
in Healthcare Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266 (2011). 
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licensing reforms (such as reciprocity agreements) that would allow 
workers to forgo obtaining a license would require states to forgo some 
revenue, they would not impose a substantial fiscal burden on states.256 
In 2016, fees from occupational and business licenses together only 
accounted for a little more than one percent of states’ total revenues on 
average.257 Other licensing reforms (such as expanding nurses’ scopes of 
practice) would not necessarily even require states to forgo licensing 
fees. 
Nevertheless, I argue that federal intervention is still necessary for 
three reasons: First, states lack the incentives to engage in large-scale 
experiments to reduce the burdens of their licensing systems. Second, 
individual state’s licensing policies have externalities that affect the 
United States labor market as a whole. Third, licensing presents 
collective action problems that states cannot easily resolve on their own. 
These reasons apply to occupational licensing generally, not just to 
licensing requirements for health care providers. The following sections 
examine each of these claims in more detail. 
1. Experimentation 
One reason why federal intervention is necessary is that states lack 
sufficient incentives to engage in large-scale experimentation with their 
licensing regimes on their own. This might seem counterintuitive: one 
of the classic justifications for state governance is that it encourages 
experimentation and enables states to test policies on a smaller-scale 
before adopting them nationwide.258 However, as scholars have shown, 
states do not independently engage in as much regulatory 
experimentation as policymakers would like.259 Scholars cite several 
possible reasons for this relative lack of experimentation, including the 
costs of developing regulatory innovations and the ability of other states 
to “free ride” on successful innovations, and the fear of scaring off 
businesses.260 
 
256. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, supra note 14, at 18. 
257. Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections (STC), U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, tbl. ‘2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections 
Detailed Table (2016), available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/ 
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk#. 
258. Lee & Moncrieff, supra note 255, at 269-270 (“Experimentation—the 
ability of states to act as laboratories of democracy—is probably the most 
frequently invoked functional advantage of state governance.”) (citing 
New Ice State Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
259. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1764-65. 
260. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 567-568 (citing Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 615 (1980); Rubin & Feeley, 
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As discussed, there are several forces preserving the status quo with 
regard to licensing, including licensing’s public choice dynamics.261 
Although states have been all too willing to “experiment” with imposing 
idiosyncratic requirements to obtain a license, they have not been 
nearly so willing to experiment with reforms that would ease the labor 
market burdens of licensing or fundamentally alter the structure of their 
licensing systems.262 Many of the problems that plague our licensing 
system today stem from our licensing system’s original architecture: for 
instance, Barbara Safriet describes the history of scope-of-practice laws 
as “exerting a gravitational force that continues to skew all attempts 
to modify non-physician scopes of practice.”263 
One advantage of a federalist approach is that it can encourage 
states to act more boldly than they would if left to their own devices.264 
Some of the most important state policy innovations have come not 
when states act on their own, but when they implement federal law.265 
For example, the ACA itself was famously modeled on Governor 
Romney’s health care reform plan in Massachusetts, but that plan in 
turn was enabled by a Medicaid waiver from the Bush 
Administration.266 Similarly, as shown in Part III, many of the limited 
state experiments with licensing—such as the formation of interstate 
compacts and the adoption of new supervision regimes for licensing 
boards—are the result of federal prodding.267 
A more ambitious federalist approach to licensing could incentivize 
states to adopt bolder experiments, such as those that have been 
adopted in Canada. In 1991, the Canadian province of Ontario enacted 
legislation that transformed its licensing system for health care 
providers from one much like that in the United States—a profession-
specific licensing system with exclusive scopes of practice controlled by 
 
supra note 29, at 925-926; David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551-60 (2005)). 
261. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
262. Larkin, supra note 75, at 222 (“One of the benefits of a federal system 
is that states can explore different regulatory regimes. Yet some 
differences are inexplicable. It is difficult to imagine a legitimate 
justification for caring more about whether someone’s hair looks 
‘marvelous’ than whether his heart can be restarted.”). 
263. Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note 100, at 308; 
264. Gluck, [National] Federalism, supra note 28, at 2004-2005 (“[S]tate 
experimentation . . . has arguably been better effectuated from states 
implementing federal statutory schemes than from them acting alone”). 
265. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1764-65; 
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 29, at 925. 
266. Id. at 1765. 
267. See supra Part III. 
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members of the licensed professions—to one common regulatory regime 
for all health professions controlled in large part by public appointees.268 
The law also established an advisory council, charged with continually 
revisiting the regulatory regime and offering recommendations to 
update it, including whether regulated professions should no longer be 
regulated.269 A 2001 review of the Act—while noting various suggestions 
for improvements—concluded that it brought about “a clear paradigm 
shift in the manner and mode of health profession regulation in 
Ontario,” and that “[t]he paradigm of profession-centered regulation 
gave way to public interest regulation.”270 
Canada has also implemented reforms to make licenses more 
portable across provinces and improve workers’ mobility. In 2009, the 
Canadian federal government and provincial and territorial 
governments signed a free trade agreement which made it easier for 
workers in regulated fields to move across provinces by requiring 
provincial regulators to demonstrate why workers from other provinces 
are not qualified to be licensed in their jurisdictions.271 Thereafter, the 
provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan 
went even further by establishing mutual recognition for a number of 
different regulated professions.272 These reforms appear much more 
wide-ranging and radical than the professional compacts that are being 
adopted in the United States. 
2. Externalities 
State policymakers also do not have incentives to take into account 
the impacts of their own state’s occupational licensing regimes on 
residents of other states. Each state’s licensure laws contributes to a 
national system that impedes the adoption of new modes of service 
delivery in fields such as health care and law that—if implemented—
could improve access to services across the United States.273 Yet state 
 
268. Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note 100, at 327-28. 
269. About, HEALTH PROFESSIONS REGULATORY ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
https://www.hprac.org/en/about/mandate.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 
2017). 
270. HEALTH PROFESSIONS REGULATORY ADVISORY COUNCIL, ADJUSTING THE 
BALANCE: REVIEW OF THE REGULATED HEALTH PROFESSIONS ACT 17 
(2001). 
271. HADRIAN MERTINS-KIRKWOOD, LABOUR MOBILITY IN CANADA ISSUES AND 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 7 (October 
2014). 
272. Professional or Skilled Tradesperson, NEW WEST P’SHIP, 
http://www.newwestpartnershiptrade.ca/professional_or_skilled_trades
person.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  
273. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way 
Courts Regulate Legal Markets, 143 DAEDALUS 83 (2015). 
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policymakers only have incentives to take these developments into 
account to the extent that they affect their own states’ residents. Nor 
do state policymakers have incentives to take fully into account the 
extent to which their licensing regimes affect health care spending, since 
the federal government shoulders almost one-third of the nation’s 
health care expenditures.274 
In addition, states do not have incentives to consider the impacts 
of their licensing systems on the U.S. labor market as a whole. 
Economists have recently documented worrisome declines in various 
indicators of “labor market fluidity” in recent decades, including the 
proportion of workers changing jobs, getting a new job, or relocating 
from one state to another.275 Reduced labor market fluidity in turn has 
been linked to lower employment, especially for young and less educated 
workers.276 Although it is unlikely that the growth of occupational 
licensing is the primary driver of this reduced fluidity, economists have 
hypothesized that it may be playing a contributing role by making it 
harder for workers to move to another state or get a new job.277 State 
legislatures and licensing boards do not have sufficient incentives to 
consider these macroeconomic effects when deciding which professions 
should be licensed and how their licensing rules should be structured, 
nor should they be expected to do so.278 
 
274. NHE Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-
trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2017); see also Moncrieff, supra note 180, at 847-848 
(making an analogous argument in the context of medical malpractice). 
275. See Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in the U.S. 
Labor Market, BROOKINGS INST. (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
bpea-articles/understanding-declining-fluidity-in-the-u-s-labor-market/; 
Raven Molloy et al., Declining Migration within the U.S.: The Role of the 
Labor Market, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 20065 
(2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20065.pdf. 
276. See Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, Labor Market Fluidity and 
Economic Performance, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 20479, 2014); See also, ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF 
JOBS 154-177 (2012) (describing the disparity in mobility between more 
and less educated Americans, and the economic consequences of less 
educated Americans’ lack of mobility). 
277. See WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 39, 40; Davis & Haltiwanger, supra 
note 276, at 28; but see Raven Molloy et al., Job Changing and the Decline 
in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 631, 
649 (2017). 
278. Schleicher, supra note 21, at 150 (“[T]he central problem is that state and 
local policymakers do not have incentives to protect the broader national 
labor market. Only federal policymakers can be expected to act on behalf 
of such an interest”). 
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3. Collective Action 
The current system of state licensing also presents collective action 
problems because it insulates in-state professionals from out-of-state 
competition.279 Although state governments could in theory improve 
access to health care for their citizens by unilaterally reducing their own 
licensing barriers (for instance, by accepting out-of-state licenses or 
allowing out-of-state providers to deliver services remotely without an 
in-state license), doing so would increase competition for in-state 
professionals while at the same time benefiting out-of-state providers. 
This is similar to the dynamic in international trade that makes 
countries unwilling to unilaterally reduce tariffs, even though doing so 
would provide consumer benefits in the form of lower prices.280 
A more plausible approach is for states to form bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements that would benefit both in-state and out-of-
state professionals. Yet the transaction costs associated with forming 
and maintaining such agreements render it unlikely that all 50 states 
will be able voluntarily reach agreements that effectively address 
licensing barriers to accessing care for the full range of health care 
professions.281 As discussed, professional regulatory organizations and 
states have already begun to form interstate compacts for a number of 
health care professions.282 However, some of these agreements have only 
 
279. Neil Siegel defines a “collective action problem” as “a situation in which 
individually rational action by states leads to collectively irrational 
results.” Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1941 (2013). 
280. THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 80 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“[T]he logic of collective action helps us understand why governments 
rarely liberalize trade unilaterally, but have been willing to do so through 
negotiated agreements. Reciprocal trade agreements make it easier for 
export-oriented industries to overcome the collective action 
problem . . . Reciprocal trade agreements provide large benefits in the 
form of access to foreign markets to small groups of export-oriented 
firms . . . . These . . . firms will solve the collective action problem they 
face and lobby for trade liberalization at home in exchange for the removal 
of foreign barriers to their exports”); see also Richard E. Levy, Federalism 
and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1997) (“Although[] 
a group of states is generally better off collectively if the members of the 
group pursue free trade policies, from the perspective of individual states 
there are strong incentives to behave in protectionist ways regardless of 
what other members of the group do”). 
281. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 32, at 139-44 (describing the transaction 
costs entailed in forming voluntary interstate agreements). But see Aziz 
Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism 
Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 220 (2014) (arguing that simply 
identifying a collective action problem does not necessarily provide a 
sufficient justification for federal intervention). 
282. See supra Part III(b). 
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come about after the federal government provided funding for them, 
many of them are relatively limited in scope, and there is limited 
empirical evidence as yet that any of them has achieved their goals, 
such as improving mobility or increasing access to telehealth.283 
C. Federalism Versus Federal Preemption 
Despite the intuitive appeal of federal preemption, a federalist 
approach to occupational licensing reform is more feasible than outright 
preemption. Interest group politics, as well as Congress’s reluctance to 
preempt state law and its reliance on state administration, make it 
unlikely that Congress will preempt large swaths of state occupational 
licensing law. A federalist approach also has functional advantages: 
preserving state variation allows for more experimentation than setting 
one-size-fits-all standards at the federal level; and it enables the federal 
government to take advantage of states’ institutional expertise in 
regulating occupations. 
1. Interest Group Politics 
Historically, professional associations and licensing boards—which, 
as discussed above, exert outsized influence in maintaining the status 
quo—have opposed federal preemption of state licensing laws.284 For 
instance, medical associations and licensing boards opposed the Clinton 
Administration’s proposal to limit state scope of practice restrictions 
(one of the few occasions on which the federal government has seriously 
considered preempting state licensing laws), “arguing that more 
permissive practice laws would jeopardize the quality of care being 
delivered and that the federal government would be encroaching into a 
field of regulation more properly left to the states.”285 The American 
Medical Association and medical licensing boards (and likely also state 
legislatures) also oppose the idea of the federal government replacing 
our current system with a system of federal licensure, creating a federal 
license for telemedicine, or passing federal legislation that would 
preempt state restrictions on telehealth.286 Opponents of federal 
 
283. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
285. Mark R. Yessian & Joyce M. Greenleaf, The Ebb and Flow of Federal 
Initiatives to Regulate Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION OF 
THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 185 (Timothy Jost, ed., 1992). 
286. Zilis, supra note 87, at 214; Sulentic, supra note 122, at 37; AM. MED. 
ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE COMPACT (2017), 
available at https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-
browser/specialty%20group/arc/fsmb-interstate-medical-licensure-
compact-issue-brief.pdf (“Importantly, the [Interstate Medical Licensure] 
Compact is the first line of defense against troubling federal proposals to 
create a federal telemedicine license, or to change the site of practice from 
where the patient is located to where the physician is located for purposes 
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licensure argue that states are better able to ensure public safety, 
though they may also be concerned about the loss of revenue that would 
be associated with such a proposal.287 Even proponents of federal 
preemption concede that such efforts would face strong headwinds from 
interest groups.288 
History suggests that a federalist approach may be more successful 
at overcoming interest group opposition than simply trying to preempt 
state licensing laws. In contrast to the federal preemption proposals 
discussed above, the federal government has already demonstrated that 
it is capable of implementing measures to encourage states to reform 
their licensing systems while largely preserving states’ control over the 
system.289 
There are a few reasons why a federalist approach might be better 
able to overcome interest group opposition. First, whereas preempting 
state licensing laws would require Congress to upend our existing 
system, a federalist approach would enable Congress to proceed in a 
more incremental fashion and to rely more on administrative agencies. 
As discussed above, federal agencies such as the Health Resources and 
Services Administration, the FTC, and the VA already possess some 
limited statutory authority over licensing. Congress could proceed by 
 
of telemedicine, proposals which actually would usurp state authority to 
regulate the practice of medicine. The Compact is intended to prevent 
just that.”). By comparison, the American Nurses Association has taken 
a somewhat more open-minded attitude, though it still seems skeptical of 
federal licensing. Congress on Nursing Practice and Economic Licensure 
Portability Workgroup, Nursing Licensure Portability: Options and 
Information for Registered Nurses, NURSING WORLD (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.nursingworld.org/~4af045/globalassets/docs/ana/ethics/lic
ensure-issue-brief-07-08-13.pdf (“In theory, the national and federal 
models would eliminate the barriers to practice across state lines, 
facilitating RN mobility and the provision of telehealth services. These 
models, however, warrant further examination given the dramatic change 
and untested ground they pose”). 
287. Zilis, supra note 87, at 214-15. 
288. See, e.g., Gavil & Koslov, supra note 211, at 195-196 (“Our most 
provocative suggestion is to consider national licensure for health care 
professionals, to insulate the licensure process from state-level politics and 
mitigate the effects of silo-based turf battles that must be fought 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction . . . . We recognize, however, that states rely 
on licensure fees as a source of revenue, which likely would skew states’ 
financial incentives to cede their licensing authority, and Congress might 
be reluctant to preempt long-standing state authority.”); Edward H. 
Forgotson & John L. Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Uses of 
Health Manpower: The Effect of Licensure Laws, 32 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 731, 746 (1967) (“A federal program [of licensure], if it were 
feasible, would be the most expeditious means of reform. However, 
political realism makes this course seem unpromising at this time”). 
289. See supra Part III. 
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building on this authority, for example by appropriating additional 
funds for states interested in implementing larger-scale reforms. Relying 
on agencies to implement this approach would have the additional 
advantage of helping to insulate it from interest group opposition. As 
Steven Croley has persuasively argued, administrative procedures such 
as notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review serve to bolster 
agencies’ autonomy and level the playing field for less well-resourced 
interest groups to compete with better-resourced ones, thus rendering 
agencies less susceptible to interest group influence than Congress.290 
Second, measures that indirectly affect licensing such as expanding 
health insurance, enacting delivery system reforms, or providing 
support for new health care delivery technologies would likely be 
supported by a much wider and more powerful coalition of interest 
groups since they intersect with many other issues besides licensing.291 
Finally, depending on how it is designed, a more incremental 
federalist approach may attract less intense opposition from interest 
groups. For example, regulatory associations for nurses and physicians 
have proven willing to accept federal funding to form interstate 
compacts, and have even been supportive of some of these initiatives.292 
That is not to say, however, that licensing boards and professional 
associations would necessarily support a federalist approach to licensing 
reform. For instance, in 1994, then-Representative Ron Wyden 
proposed an amendment to the Clinton Health Security Act that would 
 
290. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 135-142 (2008); Steven P. Croley, 
Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 38 (2000). That is 
not to go so far as to say that agencies are not susceptible to interest 
group influence at all, nor that agency procedures have succeeded in 
completely leveling the playing field. To the contrary, there is a large 
body of empirical literature in law and political science that finds that 
business interests participate more and exert more influence in the 
rulemaking process relative to other types of interest groups. See generally 
Gabriel Scheffler, Failure to Capture: Why Business Does Not Control the 
Rulemaking Process, 79 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
291. See Khan, supra note 208, at 127 (“[G]oing forward, the [California 
Medical Association] and other physician interest groups will likely find 
that nurse practitioners and other providers will have strong political and 
financial support to redraft licensing and scope of practice laws from 
information technology (IT) giants such as Apple, Google, Samsung, 
Facebook, and IBM. Further, from the perspective of physician 
organizations, this looming legislative battle might not be a fair fight.”). 
See generally Wansley, supra note 225. 
292. But see Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for 
Federalism and Health Care, 28 CONN L. REV. 115, 126 (1995) (“Interest 
group opposition can be overcome in American politics, but this sort of 
success normally involves a moral crusade that leads in the direction of 
uniform rights for all citizens. The need for national uniformity, however, 
is exactly what federalist solutions deny.”). 
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have established federal grants for state medical licensing boards 
contingent on their meeting new federal performance standards.293 Even 
though this proposal was relatively deferential to state licensing boards, 
it was still met with suspicion from the state licensing boards and health 
care professions.294 Still, the initiatives described in Section III suggest 
that a federalist approach will be more likely to overcome these 
challenges. 
2. Incrementalism and State Administration 
Another obstacle in the path of preempting state licensing laws is 
that Congress has historically proven unwilling to repeal important 
areas of state regulation wholesale, especially in health care.295 Although 
most scholars who have examined the issue have concluded that 
Congress possesses the Constitutional authority to preempt state 
licensing laws,296 Congress has historically taken a narrower 
interpretation of its own constitutional authority to legislate on health 
care issues, dating back to the earliest days of the Republic.297 After 
 
293. Yessian & Greenleaf, supra note 285, at 185. 
294. Id. at 170. 
295. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1762 (“[O]ne 
is hard-pressed to identify any examples of major social policy legislation 
in which Congress wiped the slate clean of all preexisting state structures 
and enacted comprehensive, federal-only reform in a single legislative 
effort.”). 
296. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some 
Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally While 
Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 87, 115 (2011) 
(“[L]icensing is an area traditionally ceded to the states. That is likely a 
political problem more than a constitutional one.”); Hoffman & Rowthorn, 
supra note 117, at 15 (“A national licensure system may raise Tenth 
Amendment concerns . . . [H]owever, arguments that the current state 
based system constrains interstate commerce could counter such concerns, 
especially if the license is limited to telemedicine.”); Nicole Huberfeld, Be 
Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of 
Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 288 (2004) (“Despite the 
jurisprudential inconsistencies, a reasonable conclusion can be reached 
that Congress would have the power under the Commerce Clause, despite 
federalism concerns, to legislate in the field of the corporate practice of 
medicine doctrine.”); Safriet, Impediments, supra note 96, at 311 (“Let 
me emphasize that, while people are often confused on this point, state-
based licensure is not a constitutional imperative. It is simply a 
tradition”). 
297. See Theodore W. Ruger, Plural Constitutionalism and the Pathologies of 
American Health Care, 120 YALE L.J. 347, 354 (2011) (“[M]embers of 
Congress in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to 
hold a limited conception of their own authority over health matters, both 
expressly in floor debates and implicitly in their failure to act.”); 
Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged 
Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 
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reviewing various federal initiatives to reform health workforce 
regulation, Yessian and Greenleaf conclude that “the great majority of 
federal initiatives proposed to regulate healthcare professionals” have 
been felled by “the federal government’s deep-seated bias toward 
inaction.”298 
Instead, when Congress does legislate on social policy, it tends to 
do so incrementally and to actively rely on states to administer new 
federal programs.299 For example, the structure of the ACA relies 
heavily on states to interpret and administer the law.300 Abbe Gluck 
cites a few factors that contribute to Congress’s tendency toward 
incrementalism and state administration: a respect for states’ authority 
in areas where they have historically held regulatory authority; the 
difficulty of achieving consensus in Congress; a lack of knowledge about 
the best policy solution and a desire to test policies on a smaller-scale 
before adopting them nationwide; and a reliance on states’ expertise in 
administering new federal programs.301 
A federalist approach has political advantages over outright federal 
preemption that might render it more successful at overcoming these 
reservations. Gluck ventures that an approach that largely preserves 
states’ authority over licensing might “assuage concerns of legislators 
who are suspicious of, or politically opposed to, the current executive 
branch’s policy agenda” since members of Congress are more likely to 
trust their own state government officials.302 By keeping the federal role 
vague, this approach might also “be more politically palatable to those 
 
229 (2012) [hereinafter Ruger, Icebergs] (“From the late eighteenth 
century onward, Congress evidenced a consistent trend of legislating 
on healthcare topics with less than what others within and outside of 
government thought its full Commerce Clause authority would permit. 
In so doing, Congress appears to have been acting on a perception of 
its own power in this area that was more cramped than that shared 
by other branches”). 
298. Yessian & Greenleaf, supra note 285, at 186. 
299. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1761-63; 
Ruger, Icebergs, supra note 297, at 233-34. 
300. See Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals about Health Law, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 49, 60 (I. Glenn Cohen, 
Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage eds., 2017) (“Both the 
establishment of the exchanges and the Medicaid expansion rely on state 
administrators to give content to the ACA’s broad strokes by interpreting 
and implementing the law . . . . The fact that two of the most important 
policies of the ACA rely on state-level implementation reflects both a 
history of shared governance in health regulation and also Congress’s 
opinion (at least in the Senate) that this federalist norm was important 
to preserve.”). 
301. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1761-64. 
302. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 573. 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Unlocking Access to Health Care:  A Federalist Approach to Reforming 
Occupational Licensing 
352 
who generally resist federal aggrandizement or prefer ‘smaller’ 
government or local variation,” and it might prove to be less of an 
affront to those who think the states should continue to control 
licensing.303 
Preserving state variation in licensing policy would also address the 
concern that Congress doesn’t have enough information to enact the 
optimal licensing reform.304 Although proponents of federal preemption 
may object that such an approach is slower and less efficient than 
having Congress step in and set federal standards,305 the potential 
downside of having the federal government pick certain standards and 
apply them nationwide is also bigger, since there is no guarantee that 
the federal government will set the optimal standards.306 For instance, 
if the federal government were to adopt federal scope-of practice 
standards, it could actually reduce access to care to the extent that the 
federal scope-of-practice standards were set to match the strictest state 
requirements.307 
Finally, a federalist approach would enable the federal government 
to take advantage of states’ institutional experience in regulating 
occupations, and to avoid having to create an equivalent institutional 
apparatus at the federal level. Daniel Gilman, an Attorney Advisor at 
the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, notes that there is currently no 
federal agency “with the authority, expertise, and experience to perform 
the various licensing functions undertaken by the states, and it would 
be difficult to create one.”308 He acknowledges that this challenge is not 
insurmountable: there is plenty of expertise about occupational 
regulation in the federal government, at agencies like the Department 
of Labor, HRSA, and the FTC. But some federal preemption proposals, 
such as creating a federal system of licensure, would necessitate creating 
 
303. Id. at 572-573. 
304. Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 15, at 4 (“We believe that critics should 
demonstrate a Burkean humility before upsetting arrangements that have 
long governed these fields”). 
305. Svorny, Interstate Compact, supra note 245  
306. Safriet, Federal Options, supra note 98, at 467 (describing the advantages 
and disadvantages of federal licensure, including “the likelihood that the 
very same forces that have prevailed in many states would succeed in 
bringing about a similar result at the national level—that is, in making 
sure that national standards would embody the most restrictive, rather 
than the most progressive and empowering, scope-of-practice provisions, 
thus actually making the situation worse in those states that currently 
pursue a more enlightened approach”). 
307. Id. 
308. Gilman, supra note 296, at 91. 
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an accompanying set of institutions capable of issuing, updating, and 
enforcing federal occupational licensing laws.309 
 
*   *   * 
 
All this is not to say that there is no role for federal preemption, 
nor that federal preemption is necessarily incompatible with a federalist 
approach. In fact, traditional cooperative federalist regimes have often 
made use of the threat of federal preemption: offering states the option 
of administering a certain program or having the federal government 
administer it.310 Simply maintaining the generalized threat of federal 
preemption may provide additional impetus for states to reform their 
licensing regimes.311 In addition, as outlined above, a “field-claiming” 
approach, in which the federal government makes a small series of 
encroachments onto state territory, may represent a realistic path. Yet 
reformers would be better served by viewing preemption as one of 
several tools that can be used to prod the states into reforming their 
licensing regimes, rather than as an immediate or exclusive solution. 
V. Conclusion 
This article presents a model for how the federal government can 
encourage states to reform the current system of occupational licensing 
for health care providers, and argues that such an approach would be 
more viable than either leaving licensing to the states or advocating for 
outright federal preemption. Although this paper focuses primarily on 
occupational licensing in health care, it also suggests that a federalist 
model could be used to change the licensing systems governing other 
fields as well.312 
 
309. Id. at 115-16. See also WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 11 (“[G]iven the 
difficulties associated with central administration and enforcement, the 
states might play a role in implementation [of Federal Licensure]”). 
310. See Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of 
Federal Law, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1997) (“Congress frequently 
encourages states to become regulatory partners in federal programs, 
sometimes by threatening to preempt the existing regulations of non-
participating states, and other times by rewarding participating states 
with substantial monetary subsidies”). 
311. See, e.g., Chaudhry et al., supra note 174, at 1582 (“[T]here has been 
concern among state boards that failure to generate a state-based 
approach to license portability could embolden supporters of a federal 
solution, such as national licensure, that might compromise states’ rights 
under the 10th Amendment and undo the patient-safety provisions (such 
as a state’s ability to investigate patient complaints locally) that are built 
into each state’s medical regulatory structures”). 
312. See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, that is not to say that affecting widespread change in 
our licensing system will be easy or quick. The licensing system in the 
United States has proven remarkably intractable since its inception, 
and any change will likely have to be incremental. Nearly half a century 
ago, in their study of occupational licensing, Benjamin Shimberg, 
Barbara F. Esser, and Daniel H. Kruger sketched out some of the 
challenges entailed in reforming the licensing system: 
[T]he whole institution of occupational licensing is embedded in 
a morass of federal, state, and local legislation suffused with 
tradition, custom, and jealously guarded rights. There are clearly 
no simple solutions. To bring about change would involve not 
only modifications of hundreds of state laws and local ordinances 
but also negotiations among dozens of occupational interest 
groups that have, over the years, managed to achieve some sort 
of delicate balance within the existing structure. The possibility 
of change, even relatively minor change, is likely to be perceived 
as a threat by those who gain not only prestige but also tangible 
economic benefits from the existing structure. Anyone 
contemplating change must consider not only its operational 
aspects, such as amending existing legislation or modifying 
procedures, but also its psychological aspects—the way people 
perceive or respond to the proposed changes. It is probably best 
to think of modifications in licensing as an ongoing process—a 
spiral moving upward from one level to the next—that will not 
necessarily be accomplished in one, two, or even five years.313 
Despite the promise of recent developments and the resurgence of 
interest in licensing, this cautionary advice seems just as applicable 
today. Any large-scale change will require a strong and sustained 
commitment on behalf of the federal government, and will likely take 
place over a long period of time. 
Nevertheless, this article provides some reasons for optimism. It 
shows that the federal government has a range of tools at its disposal 
to encourage states to reform their licensing regimes, that it has already 
taken some initial steps to encourage states to restructure their licensing 
requirements for health care providers specifically, and that even these 
limited measures have had tangible impacts on states’ licensing regimes 
and in turn have the potential to improve access to health care. 
This lesson is especially important today, as there is a growing 
appreciation of the important consequences that state and local 
regulations have for national issues such as health care, the labor 
market, and geographic mobility. Many scholars and policymakers 
grappling with these interactions have continued to view state and local 
regulatory policy through a dual federalist framework: either advocating 
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for states to reform their own regulations, or alternatively, calling for 
large-scale federal preemption. By contrast, this article shows that at 
least in some contexts, a federalist solution may be the most realistic 
and normatively desirable solution, and that there is promising 
precedent for such an approach. 
 
